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“DOWNRIGHT INDIFFERENCE”†:
EXAMINING UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Merritt E . McAlister*
Nearly 90 percent of the work of the federal courts of appeals looks nothing
like the opinions law students read in casebooks . Over the last fifty years, the
so-called “unpublished decision” has overtaken the federal appellate courts in
response to a caseload volume “crisis .” These are often short, perfunctory de-
cisions that make no law; they are, one federal judge said, “not safe for hu-
man consumption .”
The creation of the inferior unpublished decision also has created an inferior
track of appellate justice for a class of appellants: indigent litigants . The fed-
eral appellate courts routinely shunt indigent appeals to a second-tier appel-
late process in which judicial staff attorneys resolve appeals without oral
argument or meaningful judicial oversight . For the system’s most vulnerable
participants, the promise of an appeal as of right often becomes a rubber
stamp: “You lose .”
This work examines the product of that second-class appellate justice system
by filling two critical gaps in the existing literature . First, it compiles compre-
hensive data on the use of unpublished decisions across the circuits over the
last twenty years . The data reveal, for the first time, that the courts’ contin-
ued—and increasing—reliance on unpublished decisions has no correlation
to overall caseload volume . Second, it examines the output of the second-tier
appellate justice system from the perspective of the litigants themselves . Rely-
ing on a procedural justice framework, this work develops a taxonomy of un-
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published decisions and argues for minimum standards for reason-giving in
most unpublished decisions .
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During the first week in October 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit issued 104 decisions in pending appeals.1 Two of those deci-
sions made law;2 the rest, which were “unpublished” dispositions, did not.
Three cases received oral argument. Sixty-nine of the 104 dispositions in-
volved pro se appellants pursuing civil rights claims, seeking disability bene-
fits, launching a variety of collateral attacks on state and federal convictions,
seeking sentence reductions, pursuing asylum claims, and bringing unidenti-
fied “civil” actions. Of the decisions the court issued in pro se appeals that
rejected the appeal (or, once, that vacated the judgment3), only twenty-one
1. The data discussed in this paragraph derive from a review of decisions culled
through the interactive search feature on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s
website. The data are on file with the Michigan Law Review.
2. Simms ex rel . C.J. v. United States, 839 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2016); McCray v. Fed.
Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 839 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2016).
3. United States v. Dickerson, 663 F. App’x 265 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
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of sixty-nine revealed any independent decisionmaking by the appellate
court.4 For the rest—or in 70% of the pro se appeals resolved that week—the
Fourth Circuit either affirmed “for the reasons stated by the district court” or
simply found “no error” (without further elaboration).5
If that’s shocking, it shouldn’t be. The Fourth Circuit is not an outlier.
Nearly 90% of merits decisions from the federal courts of appeals look noth-
ing like what law students read in casebooks.6 Over the last fifty years, feder-
al courts have increasingly relied on the so-called “unpublished decision” to
combat a caseload volume “crisis.”7 These decisions are not precedential and
make no law;8 they are often short, perfunctory, unsigned opinions drafted
for the benefit of the parties, not the public.9 Even their greatest judicial de-
fender once referred to unpublished decisions as “not safe for human con-
sumption.”10
The crisis that created this inferior class of appellate work, however, has
abated; today, the caseload volume of the federal courts of appeals appears to
4. The Fourth Circuit dismissed eleven of the pro se appeals on procedural grounds.
When doing so, the court always explained the reason for its decision (e.g., for lack of a timely
appeal or final judgment or because of an appeal waiver). See, e .g ., Green v. Stevenson, 669 F.
App’x 154 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
5 . See, e .g ., Teague v. Aslett, 669 F. App’x 145 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Litigants
with lawyers received more robust responses to their appeals, but the court nevertheless offered
no independent reasoning for its decision in three of the thirty-five lawyered appeals.
6. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.B-
12 (2018) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS (year)].
7. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1112 & n.9 (2011) (trac-
ing origins of the “crisis of volume” to describe the “heavy caseload” of the courts of appeals).
8 . See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the
U .S . Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1436 n.4 (2004) (discussing the private nature of un-
published decisions). Because many “unpublished decisions” are widely available, it is best to
think of the terms “published” and “unpublished” as synonymous with “precedential” and
“nonprecedential.” See, e .g ., Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions
and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 .1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705, 708 (2006) (“Today the
designation of an opinion as ‘unpublished’ refers to its status as nonprecedential.”). But see
Michael Kagan et al., Invisible Adjudication in the U .S . Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J. 683,
698–99 (2018) (examining data that show that a significant percentage of unpublished merits
decisions in immigration appeals are not publicly available on Westlaw). Because the wide-
spread availability of “unpublished decisions” remains in some doubt and because it is the term
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts uses, I will continue to use the term “un-
published,” even if some scholars have embraced “nonprecedential” instead.
9. Alex Kozinski, a prominent proponent of the unpublished decision, explained that
the unpublished decision is “a letter to the parties letting them know that the court thought
about their case and understands the issues.” Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 .1, FED. LAW., June 2004, at 36, 38. In 2017, Kozinski resigned
after being accused of sexual misconduct by numerous women, including former law clerks.
Maura Dolan, 9th Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski Steps Down After Accusations of Sexual Miscon-
duct, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-judge-
alex-kozinski-20171218-story.html [https://perma.cc/W63F-RWEK].
10 . Kozinski, supra note 9, at 37.
536 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:533
be receding.11 But the inferior work remains—and, worse yet, it has birthed
an inferior appellate justice system.12 In seven of the twelve geographic cir-
cuits, unpublication rates hover at or over 90%.13 Judicial staff attorneys—a
position lacking the cachet of a federal clerkship—review and resolve appeals
destined for nonpublication without significant judicial oversight or the ben-
efit of oral argument.14 Judges are too busy to do more than (hopefully) en-
sure the correct result in these cases.
Traditional appellate process—including oral argument and judicial
scrutiny—continues for the system’s haves. But for its have-nots, the prom-
ise of an appeal as of right has become little more than a rubber stamp: “You
lose.” Data, historical accounts, and anecdotal evidence all suggest that the
unpublished decision revolution aligns closely with the rise of pro se ap-
peals—the appellate justice system’s “have-nots.” Appeals from these vulner-
able litigants occupy half of the federal appellate docket,15 but they surely
receive far less than half of judges’ attention. Instead, resource-strapped
courts shift their attention to more complex and well-lawyered civil disputes.
Unsurprisingly, the unpublished decision—perhaps the most prominent
feature of second-tier appellate process—has been the target of significant
scholarly criticism.16 But much of that criticism has attacked unpublished
decisions categorically.17 That attack has failed to persuade busy courts to
11 . See infra Section I.B (discussing caseload statistics).
12. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Cer-
tiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275–76 (1996) (de-
scribing two-track system of federal appellate process); see also Pether, supra note 8, at 1460–61
(similar); David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Un-
published Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1668–70 & n.3 (2005) (same).
13 . See infra Figure 2.
14 . See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Man-
agement in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 345–54 (2011) (describing role of judicial staff
attorneys).
15 . See JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-9 (2018).
16. While advocating for lower-court court-packing, Steven Calabresi recently identi-
fied the swell of nonprecedential decisions as “an atrocious symptom of the caseload problem.”
Memorandum from Steven G. Calabresi, Professor, Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law & Shams Hirji, J.D.
2017, Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, to Senate & House of Representatives 7 (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/calabresi-court-packing-memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4FR-UT3R] (internal capitalization and emphasis omitted). Another
scholar observed: “[T]he proliferation in American courts of the mass destruction of opinions
is so horrible for so many reasons that it is hard to keep track.” Arthur J. Jacobson, Publishing
Dissent, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1607, 1607 (2005).
17 . See, e .g ., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.) (holding that
court’s publication rules violated Article III), vacated en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000);
Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65 UCLA L. REV. 808 (2018)
(arguing that at least some unpublished decisions violate retroactivity principles); Richard B.
Cappalli, The Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755
(2003) (arguing that unpublished decisions violate common-law principles); Martha J. Drag-
ich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of
Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757
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abandon the practice; instead, it continues to proliferate. In the meantime,
the creation of the unpublished decision has led to pervasive decisional atro-
phy—atrophy that has been lamented but largely unexamined. Although the
“lower quality of unpublished opinions may be the most important of the
costs of limited publication,”18 it has been nearly forty years since any schol-
ar seriously examined the substance of unpublished decisions, which now
dominate the output of the federal courts of appeals.19
In September 2017, the most influential federal appellate judge—
Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit—
reinvigorated this debate by focusing our attention to what he viewed as per-
vasive systemic injustice over how the federal courts handle indigent appeals.
After his abrupt resignation, Posner told the New York Times that “most
judges regard these people”—pro se and indigent litigants—“as kind of trash
not worth the time of a federal judge.”20 To highlight the problem, Posner
self-published a book detailing the extent of the federal courts of appeals’ re-
liance on staff attorneys and the “downright indifference of most judges to
the needs of pro se’s.”21 In Posner’s view, “it [is] imperative—the imperative
of basic decency—that the orders that judges issue in pro se cases, together
with any supplemental documents, be complete, sufficient, and intelligible to
the pro se litigants and not just to the judges.”22
Although the controversy Posner’s work stirred may have drowned out
his message,23 his indictment hit the mark.24 Judicial indifference to the ap-
(1995) (arguing that unpublished decisions pose systemic threat to principles of stare decisis);
Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; or Why
the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules Are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 958–60 & nn.14–19 (2009) (collecting scholarship describing separa-
tion-of-powers, due process, and First Amendment concerns with unpublished and nonprece-
dential decisions); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 275 (arguing that unpublished
decisions violate judicial adjudicatory norms).
18. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication
in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 606 (1981).
As the late Judge Stephen Reinhardt once observed: “Those who believe we are doing the same
quality work that we did in the past are simply fooling themselves.” Stephen Reinhardt, Too
Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, 52; see also Richman & Reynolds, supra
note 12, at 293–95 (describing degradation of quality of decisionmaking resulting from use of
unpublished decisions).
19. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18.
20. Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, Judicial Provocateur, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-
posner-retirement.html [https://perma.cc/88E7-X4SW] (quoting Posner as saying, “[a]bout six
months ago . . . I awoke from a slumber of 35 years” and “suddenly realized” that “people
without lawyers are mistreated by the legal system”).
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: MY FORMER COURT
NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF ATTORNEY PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS ORAL
ARGUMENTS 31 (2017).
22 . Id . at 20–21.
23 . See, e .g ., Jonathan H. Adler, Richard Posner’s ‘Bats––– Crazy’ New Book, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
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pellate system’s most vulnerable litigants has become commonplace.25 Even
if Posner rightly called our attention to “the separate-but-equal appellate re-
view that pro [se] litigants receive,”26 others have questioned how Posner’s
proposed solution—better and clearer judicial decisions in pro se cases—
would benefit pro se litigants.27
This work grapples with that question by considering reason-giving
across all unpublished decisions. Decisional atrophy disproportionately af-
fects pro se litigants because their cases are more likely to receive the second-
class treatment that produces the poorly or lightly reasoned unpublished de-
cisions that Posner finds so problematic. Some features of a two-tier appel-
late justice system may be necessary: reliance (to some extent) on judicial
staff, the use of unpublished decisions, and the reduction of oral argument,
for example. For present purposes, I stipulate that some type of appellate tri-
age system may be a wise use of judicial resources. But the question of deci-
sional atrophy and the erosion of reason-giving in unpublished decisions
deserves special attention—regardless of how we might design that triage
system.
Some decisional atrophy was expected as the appellate courts abandoned
lawmaking norms in their embrace of unpublished decisions.28 In a com-
mon-law system, reason-giving is effectively lawmaking and thus an essential
requirement of published, precedential decisions.29 But in an appellate sys-
conspiracy/wp/2017/09/21/richard-posners-bats-crazy-new-book/ [https://perma.cc/BEH8-
PCGW]. Most of the criticism Posner received concerned his “recount[ing] his disputes with
his former benchmates in excruciating detail” and choosing “to publish all manner of material,
including memos written by staff attorneys and email correspondence among the judges.” Id .
24. Although I agree with Posner’s bottom line, some of his reasoning condescends to
the people he aims to help. See, e .g ., POSNER, supra note 21, at 20 (“Pro se’s rarely are well edu-
cated or intellectually sophisticated . . . .”); id . at 21 (“I may have created the impression that I
am ‘soft’ on pro se’s, and I am, rather, though only in part is this because of their frequent in-
tellectual and educational deficiencies . . . .”).
25. Katherine A. Macfarlane, Shadow Judges: Staff Attorney Adjudication of Prisoner
Claims, 95 OR. L. REV. 97, 114 (2016) (“It is difficult to address prisoner-brought cases without
running into an avalanche of ill will lobbed at prisoners’ attempts to seek justice through civil
litigation.”).
26. Matthew Stiegler, Posner’s New Book Is Bananas, but You Might Want It Anyway,
CA3BLOG (Sept. 18, 2017), http://ca3blog.com/judges/posners-new-book-is-bananas-but-you-
might-want-it-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/J5X4-FN4S].
27. Katherine A. Macfarlane, Posner Tackles the Pro Se Prisoner Problem: A Book Review
of Reforming the Federal Judiciary, 83 MO. L. REV. 113, 126 (2018).
28. The abandonment of the lawmaking norm is itself deeply problematic. But others
have written thoughtfully on this issue. See, e .g ., Cappalli, supra note 17, at 759 (arguing that
“the American legal system suffers from the practices of appellate judges in choosing to label
the bulk of their actions as non-precedential—choices that defy the wisdom of the common
law”). At this point, unpublished decisions are here to stay; the goal of this work is, instead, to
initiate a dialogue on better ways of doing unpublished decisions.
29 . See William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1723, 1725 (2005) (explaining that under the common-law appellate model, “judges
hear[] oral arguments, confer[] with their colleagues on the panel, and sometimes with the help
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tem dominated by nonprecedential decisions, reason-giving can undermine
efficiency goals. If a court is not establishing precedent, a reasoned explana-
tion in an unpublished decision may take time away from work on (presum-
ably more important) published decisions—or so the efficiency rationale for
unpublished decisions goes.30 To maximize efficiency, indeed, we might ex-
pect courts to say nothing at all when handing down unpublished disposi-
tions.
Scholarly work in this area thus has been insensitive to these two foun-
dational yet competing considerations: the efficiency interests that un-
published decisions may properly serve and the procedural justice effects of
decisions that slam shut courthouse doors on vulnerable litigants. Although
some have observed—and even lauded—the efficiency benefits of un-
of a single clerk, [write] fully reasoned, precedential, published opinions in nearly all cases”); cf .
Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the
Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 105–12 (2007) [hereinafter
Mashaw, Reasoned Administration] (discussing role of the right to reasons in administrative
law); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 20 (2001) [hereinafter Mashaw, Small Things]
(discussing failure to provide adequate reasons as a ground for reversal of an administrative
order).
More broadly speaking, scholars and judges alike have historically described judicial rea-
son-giving in absolute terms. See Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The
Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 648, 655 (1980) (“Every judge
should be required to give his reasons for a decision, and these reasons should be sufficient not
only to explain the result to the litigants but also to enable other litigants to comprehend its
precedential value and the limits to its authority.”); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participa-
tion, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV.
410, 412 (1978) (“The adjudicator should explain his decision in a manner that provides a sub-
stantive reply to what the parties have to say.”); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 285
n.58 (“In our law . . . the exercise of a power to speak authoritatively as an interpreter carries
with it an obligation to explain the grounds upon which the interpreter gives that authoritative
judgment.” (alteration in original) (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism,
and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV 827, 838 (1991))); Patricia
M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Chal-
lenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 768 (1983) (“[T]he courts’ opinions should contain reasoned expla-
nations of their decisions to lend them legitimacy, permit public evaluation, and impose a
discipline on judges.”).
30 . See, e .g ., K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the
Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 418 (2001) (“[S]ome decisions
do have the potential to play a more significant role in shaping future decisions. Courts should
be permitted to spend additional time in producing these decisions.”); William H. Pryor, Jr.,
Opinion, Conservatives Should Oppose Expanding the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/conservatives-expanding-federal-
courts.html [https://perma.cc/G9L3-ZKNR] (“Today, courts use unpublished opinions to issue
quick, reasoned decisions in routine cases based on settled precedent. For example, thousands
of petitions to review deportations and denials of Social Security benefits turn on discrete facts
determined by administrative law judges; hearing oral arguments and issuing published opin-
ions in most would only delay decisions that should be speedy.”).
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published decisions,31 no scholar has considered how procedural justice ex-
periences might inform the content and process of unpublished decisions.
In “general legal parlance,” “procedural justice . . . refers to the fairness
of a process by which a decision is reached.”32 There is a rich body of litera-
ture on normative procedural justice theory.33 But I am more interested in a
“bottom-up”34 understanding of procedure. For that view, what matters
more is “the subjective assessments by individuals [in the justice system] of
the fairness of a decision making process.”35 Although little work has been
done to understand the subjective experience of appellate litigants in par-
ticular, Tom R. Tyler’s groundbreaking work36 on other touchpoints with
the justice system offers us some view into how unpublished decisions may
be received by their intended audience: the parties themselves. Based on ex-
tensive social psychology work, Tyler has identified core procedural justice
values—principally, participation, dignity, respect, and the neutrality and
trustworthiness of the decisionmaker37—that inform individual perceptions
of procedural fairness.
A cautious extrapolation of Tyler’s work to the appellate context sug-
gests that procedural justice experiences turn, in substantial part, on the ex-
tent of judicial process afforded the appellant and the extent of reasons given
for the appellate decision. We can easily perceive considerable tension, then,
31 . See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with Anasta-
soff); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178–79
(1999) (“Whereas academicians tend to see unpublished opinions as causing a variety of sys-
temic problems, judges tend to see them as a necessary, and not necessarily evil, part of the
job.” (footnote omitted)); Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals
Judge in the Information Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 409 (1994) (discussing “several advantages”
of limited publication regimes); Christian F. Southwick, Note, Unprecedented: The Eighth Cir-
cuit Repaves Antiquas Vias with a New Constitutional Doctrine, 21 REV. LITIG. 121 (2002)
(evaluating policy arguments).
32. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law:
Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3.
33 . E .g ., Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs . Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803
(1997); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 280 (2004).
34. Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478, 1527
(2019) (articulating a view of “bottom-up” procedural scholarship that “follow[s] poor litigants
through systems of civil justice,” including, “perhaps most importantly,” by “interviewing . . .
litigants themselves”).
35. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 32, at 3 (footnote omitted). As explained
more fully below, see infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text, I am sensitive to the well-
founded critique that many criminal justice scholars and critical race theorists have lodged at
procedural justice work and its legitimacy theory. See generally, e .g ., Monica C. Bell, Police Re-
form and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017).
36 . See, e .g ., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) [hereinafter TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW]; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) [hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice]; see also infra
notes 150–163 and accompanying text (discussing Tyler’s work).
37 . See infra notes 147, 150–152 and accompanying text (discussing core procedural
justice values in law and psychology).
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between the importance of appellate procedural justice experiences and the
efficiency rationale of unpublished decisions (and the second-tier appellate
justice system itself). Unpublished decisions with the greatest procedural jus-
tice effects—fully explained decisions issued after oral argument—are re-
source intensive for courts to issue, thereby defeating the goals of an
unpublication scheme.
My work is the first to plumb this tension. I do so, first, by bringing
much-needed empirical work on the use of unpublished decisions up to date
with an examination of the last twenty years’ worth of data on the federal
courts of appeals’ decisional practices.38 This empirical work both unsettles
the historical efficiency narrative for unpublished decisions and highlights a
correlation between pro se litigation and unpublished decisions. Second, I
consider the procedural justice effects of unpublished decisions—especially
those that omit independent reasons for the appellate court’s judgment, as
many unpublished decisions do.
Ultimately, I will show that the time-saving rationale for unpublished
decisions is mostly a myth—one that has insulated thousands of appellate
decisions from public scrutiny, stripped them of any precedential value, and
deprived litigants of a meaningful response to their appeals. I contend that
the failure of appellate courts to provide reasoned explanation for many un-
published decisions is both marginalizing and (potentially) legitimacy
threatening39—a consequence that Tyler warns may follow when courts are
insensitive to procedural justice concerns.40
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the landscape of un-
published decisions, including the institutional pressures that created the
unpublished decision and the ways the unpublished decision has been used
over time and across the circuits. This Part also examines empirical data on
the continued use of unpublished decisions across the circuits, despite a de-
crease in overall caseload volume and some remarkable efficiency statistics.
From there, I consider more closely the output of the second-tier appel-
late justice system by examining what unpublished decisions look like on the
ground and how they might be received by the parties. Part II frames this in-
quiry by establishing a procedural justice lens for unpublished decisions.
38. This Article focuses on merits decisions from the U.S. courts of appeals. That is a
significant limitation in two respects: I do not consider nonmerits appellate decisions or deci-
sions from state appellate courts. The federal appellate courts issue a significant number of
procedural terminations every year, but data tracking the publication status of those resolu-
tions are not generally available. Likewise, very little data are available on the use of un-
published decisions at the state level, which is a common and varied practice.
39. I use “legitimacy” here in both a sociological and a moral sense—not necessarily in a
legal sense; my argument does not turn on whether any particular unpublished decision has
been wrongly decided (and therefore is arguably legally illegitimate). See generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794–1801 (2005) (dis-
cussing and describing different concepts of legitimacy).
40 . See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 36, at 162 (“Procedural justice is
the key normative judgment influencing the impact of experience on legitimacy.”).
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Part III then articulates a taxonomy of unpublished decisions based on pro-
cedural justice values, including the degree of participation by litigants and
reason-giving by the courts of appeals.
Part IV explores this Article’s central thesis: that, to further procedural
justice values and avoid the marginalization attendant in their absence, ap-
pellate courts should almost always offer independent reasons for their deci-
sions, even nonprecedential ones. Finally, I briefly conclude by
recommending that our federal courts of appeals give renewed attention to
the quality of their unpublished decisions and the harm they may unwitting-
ly inflict on the decision’s recipients.
I. THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND USE OF THE UNPUBLISHED DECISION
The history of the unpublished decision reveals the forces at play in its
creation.41 That history is more troubling than the popular efficiency narra-
tive suggests. Unpublished decisions emerged in response to a caseload crisis
of a particular kind—an increase in prisoner litigation during the 1950s and
1960s. From the outset, the most vulnerable federal litigants were the impe-
tus for unpublished adjudications—a trend that appears to have continued
into the present, as the second section of this Part highlights.
A. A Short History of the Unpublished Decision
Although limited publication has been a topic of discussion since the
1940s,42 its history begins in earnest in 1964.43 That year, the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States44 first recommended “that judges publish only
those opinions ‘which are of general precedential value.’ ”45
Two concerns drove that recommendation. First, by the early part of the
twentieth century, everyone—judges, lawyers, academics, and law librari-
ans—began expressing concern over the burgeoning decisional law in the
41. William Reynolds and William Richman have produced the most comprehensive
and probing scholarship on the use of unpublished decisions, beginning in 1978. See Marin K.
Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2390 (2014) (“[N]o one has contributed
more to this field than [Richman and Reynolds].”). Their work was recently consolidated into
an excellent book, WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL:
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (2013).
42. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1167, 1169 (1978).
43. Dragich, supra note 17, at 761 (discussing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11
(1964)).
44. The Judicial Conference was created by Congress in 1922 and frames policy guide-
lines for administration of the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
45. Dragich, supra note 17, at 761 (quoting ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra
note 43, at 11 (adopting resolution “[t]hat the judges of the courts of appeals and the district
courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which are of general precedential value
and that opinions authorized to be published be succinct”)).
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United States.46 There was too much case law for anyone to master, effective-
ly search, or house. As one judge put it a century ago: “The law library of the
future staggers the imagination as one thinks of multitudes of shelves which
will stretch away into the dim distance . . . .”47 Thankfully, technological in-
novations unforeseen at the time ultimately would moot this concern.
Second, the federal courts began to face a different kind of “crisis of vol-
ume”: a caseload crisis.48 Between 1960 and 1965, the number of appeals
filed in the federal courts nearly doubled.49 By 1970, the volume had tri-
pled.50 The trend would continue. Between 1945 and 1990, the number of
appeals filed in the courts of appeals increased fifteen-fold.51 The appellate
caseload growth rate outpaced new filings in the district courts; litigants
were not just filing more cases—they were appealing more often.52 Concur-
rently, the number of authorized judgeships increased by almost 50%, but
that increase failed to keep pace with the rapid caseload growth.53
That growth followed on the heels of a dramatic expansion of federal
rights through congressional and judicial action. Since the 1960s, Congress
has continuously expanded federal criminal and civil jurisdiction.54 In-
creased litigiousness,55 coupled with Warren Court decisions that expanded
46. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 42, at 1168–69 (describing concerns over growing
volume of decisional law).
47. John B. Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 ILL. L. REV. 157, 158 (1915).
48 . See Huang, supra note 7, at 1112 n.9 (describing “crisis of volume”); see also Vladeck
& Gulati, supra note 12, at 1668 & n.2 (describing caseload volume crisis).
49. DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS 15 (2000).
50 . Id .
51. JOSEPH F. WEIS, JR., ET AL., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
110 (1990), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/RepFCSC.pdf [https://perma.cc
/QYM8-ZPTD].
52. In 1945, litigants appealed one in forty final judgments. Id . By 1990, litigants ap-
pealed one in eight. Id . Today, the appeal rate is roughly the same (13.8%). Compare JUDICIAL
BUSINESS tbl.C-3B (2018) (district court civil cases terminated), and JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.D
(2018) (district court criminal cases terminated), with JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B (2018) (number
of appeals commenced).
53 . See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS ADDITIONAL
AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/appealsauth.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5BRB-54US]. In 1960, there were sixty-eight authorized judgeships; by 1968, Con-
gress authorized an additional twenty-five permanent judgeships, four temporary judgeships,
and four temporary to permanent judgeships. Id .
54 . See Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996) (recognizing Congress’s role in expansion of federal appel-
late docket).
55 . See Marjorie Lakin & Ellen Perkins, Realigning the Federal Court Caseload, 12
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1001, 1001 & n.3 (1979) (describing increased litigiousness resulting from
“a number of socioeconomic changes” during 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, including greater access
to the court system and “rising expectations of the poorer, more disadvantaged sectors of so-
ciety”).
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criminal and civil rights, also affected federal dockets.56 Especially important
was Monroe v . Pape,57 which opened the door to civil liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations by state actors who abuse their of-
fice.58 Since that 1961 decision, federal civil rights actions under § 1983
“bec[a]me a major part of the work of the federal courts.”59
These docket changes put extraordinary pressure on the federal judici-
ary.60 That pressure had to go “somewhere,”61 and the judiciary had a num-
ber of available solutions. They could have asked Congress for help—
authorize more judges and more funding proportionate to the caseload in-
crease. They didn’t.62 Judges could have reduced the time they spent on all
cases: “[T]he federal appellate courts clearly could not have continued to give
every case a leisurely review.”63 They didn’t exactly do that, either. Instead,
they developed an “Appellate Triage model,” by which the federal courts
embraced procedural and administrative reforms to institute a two-track or
two-tier system of appellate justice.64
Those administrative reforms involved three interconnected changes.
First, judges began writing fewer precedential or lawmaking decisions, rely-
ing instead on shorter nonprecedential dispositions.65 Second, courts began
holding fewer oral arguments, especially in cases that would not lead to pub-
lished or precedential decisions.66 And, finally, judges began relying on “ad-
56. Among the changes the Warren Court brought was an expansion of the federal ha-
beas corpus remedy. See, e .g ., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) (authorizing ha-
beas corpus relief to state prisoners asserting violation of Fourth Amendment rights based on
Mapp v . Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment viola-
tions against states)).
57. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
58 . Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172, 187 (holding that Congress intended § 1983 “to give a rem-
edy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse
of his position”).
59. Michael L. Wells et al., Constitutional Remedies: Section 1983 and Related Doctrines,
in CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 15, 15 (3d ed. 2015).
60. Between 1960 and 2010, filings per authorized judgeship in the geographic courts of
appeals swelled from 57.3 to 340.1. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 8.
61. Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 61
(2016).
62. There is a significant debate over the soundness of the judiciary’s reluctance to em-
brace expansion of its ranks. Compare Richman & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 334–39 (arguing
that reluctance to embrace expansion reflects judicial elitism), and id . at 297–300 (summariz-
ing judicial opposition to expanding judiciary), with Tobias, supra note 54, at 1275–80 (identi-
fying and defending “detrimental consequences” on expanding appellate judiciary), and Levy,
supra note 41, at 2402–08 (arguing that Richman and Reynolds’s proposed cure—expanding
the judiciary—is impractical, and recommending other, administrative changes).
63. Levy, supra note 41, at 2395.
64. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at xii (discussing the creation of the “Appel-
late Triage model”).
65 . Id . at 10–21 (discussing critical changes in publication practices across the circuits).
66 . Id . at 83–94 (describing trend away from holding oral argument in every appeal).
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ditional decision makers”—principally law clerks and central staff attor-
neys—to perform judicial work, primarily to help with unpublished and
nonargued cases.67 These administrative and procedural changes have con-
tinued unabated.68
With respect to unpublished decisions, by 1978, every circuit had adopt-
ed so-called “publication plans”69—a somewhat ironic name given that the
purpose of these plans was to publish far fewer decisions. Although there
was variation among these plans,70 most plans addressed four distinct as-
pects of the unpublished decision revolution: (1) whether to authorize sum-
mary dispositions (i.e., one-word or perfunctory decisions); (2) criteria for
publication of court decisions; (3) procedures for determining which deci-
sions should be published; and (4) limitations on the citation of unpublished
decisions.71
Initially, the last of these—limitations on citation—was the most contro-
versial.72 Scholars persuasively argued that no-citation rules violated the First
Amendment.73 Others identified thorny ethical issues such rules created for
attorneys, including the scope of an attorney’s obligation to research un-
published decisions and whether an attorney must advise clients about
known unpublished decisions.74
Efforts at reform were equally controversial, as the reporter for the Advi-
sory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure has detailed.75
The Committee mulled over possible rules to address unpublished decisions,
67 . Id . at 97–111 (discussing administrative changes within the courts of appeals, in-
cluding growth of judicial staff to help resolve appeals).
68. Some have questioned whether the courts have also responded in outcome-affecting
ways, including by reducing the quality of their output to respond to increased demand. See
Lavie, supra note 61, at 66–67 (discussing potential outcome-affecting changes); see also
Huang, supra note 7 (finding that spikes in caseload crisis led to temporary reduction in rever-
sal rates).
69. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 42, at 1170–73 & nn.24–34 (describing develop-
ment of circuit rules).
70 . Id . at 1173 (recognizing that the plans were “not easily categorized”).
71 . See id . at 1173–81 (discussing key features of circuits’ publication plans).
72. That controversy would continue well into the 2000s. See generally Patrick J. Schiltz,
Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished
Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1458–90 (2005) (exploring “controversy” over efforts
to reform no-citation rules).
73 . See, e .g ., Charles L. Babcock, No-Citation Rules: An Unconstitutional Prior Restraint,
LITIGATION, Summer 2004, at 33; Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of
“No-Citation” Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287 (2001).
74 . See, e .g ., David S. Caudill, Parades of Horribles, Circles of Hell: Ethical Dimensions of
the Publication Controversy, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1653 (2005); see also J. Lyn Entrikin Goe-
ring, Legal Fiction of the “Unpublished” Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the
Ethical Duty of Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 27 (2005); Shenoa L. Payne, Note, The Ethical
Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723 (2008).
75 . See Schiltz, supra note 72, at 1433–58 (recounting “saga” around efforts to consider
and reform local no-citation rules).
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sparking widespread disagreement over whether the proposed rule should
address the precedential effect of unpublished decisions.76 After years of
study and negotiation, the Advisory Committee ultimately recommended
and passed a compromise rule, which received Supreme Court approval and
took effect on December 1, 2006.77 Under Rule 32.1, no circuit may restrict
the citation of unpublished decisions issued after January 1, 2007.78 The rule
was silent, however, on the most controversial issue at the time: what, if any,
precedential effect unpublished decisions should have. The circuits were left
to assign that effect on their own. Whether by judicial decision, local rule, or
internal operating procedure, in every circuit unpublished decisions are not
precedential.79
Rule 32.1 was the last—and only—reform of the circuits’ publication
practices. But it did not end the debate over the use of unpublished deci-
sions, which have continued to proliferate in the decade since Rule 32.1.
Scholars, too, have criticized persistently the courts’ ongoing reliance on the
unpublished decision, especially as an integral feature of a second-tier system
of appellate justice. William Richman and William Reynolds, the leading
scholars on unpublished decisions, authored a 2013 book, Injustice on Ap-
peal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis,80 as a capstone to thirty-
five years’ worth of work on the subject of unpublished decisions. The title
says it all.
76 . Id . Initially, the project was much broader, going as far as questioning the use of un-
published decisions themselves. Id . at 1439. That effort was met with almost unanimous re-
sistance from the chief judges. Id . at 1439–40. As Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C.
Circuit stated conclusively, “This is a terrible idea.” Id . at 1439.
77. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee’s notes (2006).
78. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
79. 1ST CIR. R. 32.1.0 (“An unpublished judicial opinion . . . will [be considered] for [its]
persuasive value but not as binding precedent.”); 2D CIR. R. 32.1.1 (“Rulings by summary order
do not have precedential effect.”); 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.1–.3 (“There are two forms of opinions:
precedential and not precedential.”); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (“Unpublished opinions . . . are not
precedent, except under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the
case . . . .”); 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b) (“Orders, which are unsigned, are released in photocopied
form, are not published in the Federal Reporter, and are not treated as precedents.”); 8TH CIR.
R. 32.1A (“[Unpublished opinions] are not precedent.”); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a) (“Unpublished
dispositions . . . are not precedent . . . .”); 10TH CIR. R. 32.1 (“Unpublished decisions are not
precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”); 11TH CIR. I.O.P. 6 (“Although un-
published opinions may be cited as persuasive authority, they are not considered binding prec-
edent.”); D.C. CIR. R. 36(e)(2) (“[A] panel’s decision to issue an unpublished disposition means
that the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition.”); United States v. Sanford, 476
F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n unpublished decision . . . is not precedentially binding un-
der the doctrine of stare decisis, but is considered by us for its persuasive value only.”); Collins
v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[The court] ordinarily do[es]
not accord precedential value to [its] unpublished decisions . . . [which] are ‘entitled only to the
weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning.’ ” (quoting Hupman v. Cook,
640 F.2d 497, 501 (4th Cir. 1981))).
80. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 41.
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Richman and Reynolds brought the second-class appellate justice system
into the light.81 They explained that the traditional appellate model—what
they call “the full Learned Hand Treatment”82—had become reserved only
for “important” cases brought by “serious counsel.”83 Only the elite could
ordinarily access first-tier justice, which featured oral argument and rea-
soned, published decisions written by (or at least carefully overseen by)
judges.84 Litigants who are “poor, without counsel, and with a boring, repeti-
tive problem” receive only “second-hand treatment.”85 As a result of the pro-
cedural and administrative changes described above,86 Richman and
Reynolds powerfully87 claim that the federal appellate courts have become
certiorari courts—that is, courts with discretionary and not mandatory
dockets (despite 28 U.S.C. § 1291’s command88 to the contrary).89
The late Penelope Pether’s work sharpened Richman and Reynolds’s
stinging indictment of the federal appellate courts. Relying on historical evi-
dence from the Fourth Circuit90 and public statements from Judge M. Mar-
garet McKeown,91 Pether contends that the second-tier appellate justice
system was, at least in some respects, created by design—a claim that Rich-
man and Reynolds have been reluctant to make.92 The appellate courts,
81 . See id . at 119–20 (describing tracks of appellate justice).
82 . Id . at 119.
83 . Id .
84 . Id . at 119–20.
85 . Id . at 120.
86 . See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text (describing administrative changes
that created the appellate triage system).
87 . See Levy, supra note 41, at 2400 (explaining that, even if Richman and Reynolds of-
fer an imperfect analogy, it is “difficult to overstate the significance of [their] contribution with
this analysis”).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States . . . .”).
89 . See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 120. Not all final judgments create an
appeal as of right for prisoners. See Catherine T. Struve, The Federal Rules of Inmate Appeals,
50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247, 292 (2018) (explaining that although “[i]nmate appeals from final judg-
ments in civil cases are treated as ‘appeals as of right’ governed by Appellate Rule 4,” in truth “a
significant segment of such appeals—namely, those brought by prisoners seeking postconvic-
tion habeas or § 2255 relief—are in actuality appeals by permission”).
90 . See Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1093–94 (4th Cir. 1972)
(incorporating 1968 memorandum from circuit’s chief judge to Federal Judicial Center ex-
plaining that the court had too many postconviction appeals to handle with traditional appel-
late process).
91. Pether, supra note 8, at 1436–37 n.5, 1465 (describing statements from Judge Mar-
garet McKeown from Audiotape: What Is “Authority”? Panel Presentation, held at the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools (Jan. 3–6, 2001)).
92. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 277 (“We do not believe that the transfor-
mation of the federal appellate courts into certiorari courts dispensing justice unequally has
taken place by design.”). In their later work, however, Richman and Reynolds come fairly close
to ascribing intentionality to judges: “This unilateral change in the circuit courts’ function
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Pether explains, redistributed their resources “as a response to judicial con-
cern about significantly increased appeals in both civil rights and pro se
prisoner cases.”93 As McKeown said, the “real reason” for the unpublished
decision was that courts were afraid they “were going to drown” under the
increasing number of civil rights and prisoner cases.94
Over time, the courts of appeals have institutionalized the second-tier
process through local rules and internal operating procedures.95 Some cir-
cuits have distinct procedures for handling prisoner appeals,96 immigration
appeals,97 and pro se appeals.98 All circuits rely on a centralized staff attor-
neys’ office to evaluate and resolve a significant percentage of their docket.99
Those staff attorneys typically operate independently from the judges for
whom they draft decisions; their work is overseen, instead, by a supervising
staff attorney.100 Most rarely have any face time with the judges in their cir-
cuit.101 Staff attorneys work almost exclusively on cases not tracked for oral
argument, and they are all devoted to resolving pro se appeals.102
must be seen as judicial activism of the highest order, involving not merely tinkering with
some sociopolitical hot-button issue, but rather with the role of the courts themselves.”
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 115. Indeed, they acknowledge that their “thirty-plus
years of study have left [them] with anger and despair over the creation and jealous mainte-
nance of a system that underserves the nation and shortchanges the poor and powerless.” Id . at
ix.
93. Pether, supra note 8, at 1465.
94 . Id . at 1465 n.138 (quoting Audiotape, supra note 91 (statement of Judge Margaret
McKeown)).
95 . See, e .g ., 5TH CIR. I.O.P. 34 (describing court’s screening process); 9TH CIR. R. E(1)
(describing process for classification of cases); 11TH CIR. I.O.P. 34(1) (describing court’s pro-
cess for preparation of screened or nonargued appeals); D.C. CIR. I.O.P. I.B.3 (describing du-
ties of staff attorneys in court’s legal division).
96 . E .g ., 4TH CIR. R. 34(b) (describing informal briefing process for noncapital habeas
corpus cases and cases involving pro se appellants); 4TH CIR. R. 21(c), 24 (describing rules re-
lated to prisoners’ payment of costs and fees on appeal); see also Struve, supra note 89, at 289–
300 (describing case management procedures for prisoner appeals).
97 . E .g ., 2D CIR. R. 34.2(a)(1) (placing immigration appeals on nonargument calendar).
98 . E .g ., 4TH CIR. R. 34(b) (describing informal briefing process for noncapital habeas
corpus cases and cases involving pro se appellants); 8TH CIR. I.O.P. D(2) (describing nonargu-
ment screening panels for pro se appeals).
99. POSNER, supra note 21, at 49–61, 164–65 (describing screening processes across the
circuits and use of judicial staff attorneys in that process). Most circuits also rely on staff attor-
neys to screen all appeals (notably, the Tenth Circuit does not). Id . at 56, 164–65.
100 . See id . at 162–67 (detailing staff attorney procedures across all circuits).
101 . See id . at 166–67 (concluding that only Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit staff attor-
neys have significant face time with judges).
102 . Id . at 164–65.
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B. The Widespread Use of the Unpublished Decision103
The creation of the unpublished decision swiftly eroded the lawmaking
function of the federal courts of appeals. By 1985, the courts of appeals were
publishing only 40.6% of their merits decisions.104 By 1991, the courts were
publishing barely more than 30% of their decisions.105 Not every circuit em-
braced the unpublished decision revolution to the same extent, however. In
1991, the spread between the court with the highest publication rate (at the
time, the First Circuit) and the lowest (the Fourth Circuit, as it is still) was
more than fifty points.106 By 1997, the nationwide publication rate would be
only 23.5%.107 As Figure 1 shows, the use of the unpublished decision has
continued to increase steadily over the last two decades. The year ending on
September 30, 2016 was the high-water mark for nonpublication across the
circuits: 88.7% of all merits decisions from the courts of appeals were un-
published.108
103. Data from this Section and from Appendices A and B are drawn from the statistical
resources available through the website for the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Statis-
tics & Reports, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports [https://perma.cc/6ESC-
B5XG]. Throughout this Article, “all circuits” or the “federal courts of appeals” excludes the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Administrative Office does not report data
on the Federal Circuit’s unpublished decisions. Accordingly, my focus is on the twelve geo-
graphic circuit courts with general appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, and any general
reference to the courts should be understood to exclude the Federal Circuit. The Federal Cir-
cuit does rely on unpublished decisions and summary affirmances; both practices have been
thoughtfully examined in the unique context of the Federal Circuit. See, e .g ., Paul R. Gugliuzza
& Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765
(2018) (examining use of summary affirmances in decisions on patentable subject matter);
Andrew Hoffman, Comment, The Federal Circuit’s Summary Affirmance Habit, 2018 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 419 (examining Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance practice).
104. Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 204 (2001) (compiling statistical data, including
before official reporting began in 1981). Reynolds and Richman conducted a limited one-year
study in 1978 and 1979 that suggests the unpublication rate was already over 60% by 1979.
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 587.
105. Hannon, supra note 104, at 204.
106 . Id .
107. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (1997).
108. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2016).
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FIGURE 1109
The year ending September 30, 2016 was also the year the Fourth Cir-
cuit—almost perennially the leader in unpublished decisions110—crossed the
95% unpublication threshold for the first time.111 In every geographic circuit
except for one, the publication rate has dropped over time (i.e., the unpubli-
cation rate has risen).112 As the data captured in Appendix A reveal, the D.C.
Circuit is the only outlier,113 perhaps owing to its special status as the so-
called second-highest court in the land.
Decisional atrophy is also widespread. Unpublication rates hover at or
over 90% in seven of the twelve geographic circuit courts: the Second Cir-
cuit, the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit.114 But, as Figure 2 shows, there
is also some notable disparity in the use of unpublished decisions. The mar-
109. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (1997–2018).
110. Only twice in the last twenty years has another circuit issued a greater percentage of
unpublished decisions than the Fourth Circuit: in both the year ending September 30, 2013
and the year ending September 30, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
barely edged out the Fourth Circuit. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2013); JUDICIAL BUSINESS
tbl.B-12 (2017).
111. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2016).
112 . See Appendix A.
113. While it may be tempting to exclude the D.C. Circuit from this analysis given its
unique caseload, I will not do so here for one important reason: the D.C. Circuit is the only
federal appellate court in which the rate of pro se litigation has risen while the publication rate
has also risen. See Appendix A, Figure A-1.
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gin between the leaders in unpublication and their sister circuits is signifi-
cant: no other circuit’s unpublication rate crossed the 80% mark in 2018.
FIGURE 2115
While use of unpublished decisions has continued to increase over time,
overall caseload volume has not. It appears that the “crisis” that led to the
creation of unpublished decisions has plateaued, if not receded. Figure 3 re-
flects the nationwide caseload volume trend. That downward trend is con-
sistent with the volume of appeals across most individual circuits, as
Appendix B demonstrates. The Ninth Circuit is the only court that has expe-
rienced noticeable caseload growth over the last two decades,116 but recent
years’ data suggest that trend, too, is reversing.117 Overall, courts are seeing
115. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2018).
116 . See Appendix B, Figure B-11. At first blush, the trend for the Fourth Circuit appears
either slightly positive or nearly flat. See Appendix B, Figure B-5. That trend line becomes neg-
ative if the data for 2016 are removed. Appendix B, Figure B-6. That year was an outlier for
reasons discussed below. See infra note 118. (Similarly, trend lines for other circuits would be-
come more negative if 2016 data were removed.)
117. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B (1997–2018); see also Appendix B, Figure B-11. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has experienced caseload growth due to its in-
creased volume of immigration appeals; after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the
Bush Administration abruptly streamlined deportation proceedings, which affected the Ninth
Circuit significantly. See Huang, supra note 7, at 1121–26 (exploring increased immigration
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fewer appeals year-over-year, even though they continue to issue more un-
published decisions year-over-year.
FIGURE 3118
Despite receding caseload volumes, several of the courts remain very
busy—including a few of the circuits that rely most heavily on unpublished
decisions. Compare Figure 2, which details the unpublication rate across cir-
cuits, with Figure 4 below, which tracks the number of appeals filed per au-
thorized judgeship by circuit in the year ending September 30, 2018. The
Fifth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit face the heaviest workload
in 2001, the number of administrative appeals in the Ninth Circuit increased sixfold in the
span of four years. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-9 (2001–2005). Although current numbers are on-
ly three time those of the late 1990s, the significant increase in volume has had lasting effect.
JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-9 (1997–2018).
The Second Circuit—the other circuit that experienced a caseload spike resulting from an
influx of post-September 11, 2001, immigration appeals, Huang, supra note 7, at 1121—has
experienced a slightly negative overall case-volume trend, even taking into account that short-
term crisis. See Appendix B, Figure B-3.
118. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B (1997–2018).
The spike in 2016, the third-to-last data point in Figure 3, reflects a significant increase in
original appellate proceedings resulting from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v .
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which declared the residual clause of the Armed Career
Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague, and Welch v . United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016),
which declared the Johnson ruling retroactive. JUDICIAL BUSINESS (2016), http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2016 [https://perma
.cc/8ES4-V7M8] (explaining impact of Johnson and Welch).
The high-water mark of 2005 reflects a significant spike in criminal appeals, original ha-
beas corpus petitions, and prisoner petitions following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in
Blakely v . Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v . Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
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per authorized judge and also have among the highest rates of unpublica-
tion.119 These circuits’ workloads far exceed the Judicial Conference’s
benchmark of 255 cases per judge.120 As important, however, is that several
circuits with very high unpublication rates have manageable—if not outright
modest—workloads compared to some of their sister circuits. In particular,
the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit appear to have
time to do more reason-giving—at least, if we compare their caseload vol-
umes against the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit.
FIGURE 4121
119. I have not accounted for judicial vacancies and their potential effect on workload in
this Article. Because vacancies shift over time, and may be mitigated by senior-status judges
and visiting judges, the effect of vacancies is difficult to quantify. For example, of the thirteen
vacancies on the courts of appeals at the end of the reporting year in September 30, 2018, all
but two had taken senior status, thus likely mitigating some of the consequence of the vacan-
cies. See Judicial Vacancy List for October 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/10/vacancies
[https://perma.cc/CTK5-T25N]. Nationally, senior-status judges handle more than 15% of ju-
dicial work. Lisa M. Holmes et al., Neither Gone nor Forgotten, 95 JUDICATURE 227, 231 (2012).
120. WEIS ET AL., supra note 51, at 110.
121. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-9 (2018); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
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What should be apparent by now is this: caseload volume appears to
have a weak correlation, if any, with unpublication rates. The publication
rate has not risen while caseload volumes have dropped; the circuits that is-
sue the most unpublished decisions are not necessarily the busiest courts. A
simple comparison (Figure 5) plotting the volume of appeals nationally
against the percentage of unpublished decisions over time confirms that
there is no correlation between overall caseload volume and publication
rates. Whatever is driving the continued increase in unpublication, it is not,
in fact, caseload volume.
FIGURE 5122
If appeal volume has no correlation with publication rate, as Figure 5 in-
dicates, we might wonder what—other than habit or convenience—might be
driving the ever-increasing unpublication rate.123 We know that a perceived
increase in prisoner and pro se litigation precipitated the development of the
unpublished decision in at least some judicial circuits.124 We might expect,
122 . Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B (1997–2018), with JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12
(1997–2018).
123. This is not to say that other workload considerations may not drive the trend toward
more unpublication. Cases may have become more complex, thus consuming more judicial
effort. Overall caseload volume, however, is perhaps the most obvious—and the easiest to
test—proxy for workload as a driver of unpublication.
124 . See supra text accompanying notes 93–94 (discussing historical evidence that un-
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then, that pro se litigation continues to play a role in the use of unpublished
decisions. The data generally support that suggestion. Whereas overall case-
load volume has decreased over the last two decades, pro se litigation has
not. Today, in almost every circuit pro se litigation is a greater percentage of
the courts’ workload than it was two decades ago. Figure 6 shows the nation-
al trend, while Appendix A contains circuit-by-circuit data.
FIGURE 6125
Pro se litigation in the federal appellate courts predominately involves
prisoner litigation—that is, habeas corpus claims and federal civil rights
claims from federal and state prisoners. Together, these proceedings ac-
counted for approximately 47% of pro se appeals in the year ending Septem-
ber 30, 2018, as Figure 7 shows. Additionally, original proceedings, which
include petitions for extraordinary relief, original habeas corpus proceed-
ings, and requests for permission to appeal,126 accounted for approximately
18% of pro se appellate proceedings. The next largest category was “private”
125 . See JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-9 (1997–2018). For circuit-by-circuit data, see Appen-
dix A.
126. FED. R. APP. P. 21; 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
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(i.e., nonfederal) civil proceedings, which includes claims against state actors
by nonprisoners.127
FIGURE 7128
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of prisoner appeals commence pro se;
the same is true for the vast majority of original proceedings and miscellane-
ous applications, as Figure 8 reflects (based on data from the year ending
September 30, 2018). Notably, nearly 45% of bankruptcy appeals involve pro
se appellants, even though bankruptcy appeals make up only a small fraction
of pro se appeals overall. And nearly 30% of administrative proceedings—
which include Social Security disability and immigration matters—involve
pro se litigants. Pro se appellate litigation therefore predominately involves
prisoner, civil rights, habeas corpus, and other civil proceedings affecting
vulnerable communities (including individuals in economic distress, without
permanent status in the United States, and with health crises or disabilities).
127. The Administrative Office reports the following categories of proceedings: criminal,
U.S. prisoner petitions, other U.S. civil, other private civil, bankruptcy, administrative agency
appeals, and original proceedings and miscellaneous applications. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-9
(2018).
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FIGURE 8129
Unlike general caseload volume, pro se appeal volume positively corre-
lates with the ever-increasing reliance on unpublished decisions, as Figure 9
demonstrates.130 As the percentage of pro se litigation as a fraction of the
whole grows, so, too, does the unpublication rate.131
129 . Id .
130 . Cf . David R. Stras & Shaun M. Pettigrew, The Rising Caseload in the Fourth Circuit:
A Statistical and Institutional Analysis, 61 S.C. L. REV. 421, 439 (2010) (identifying “increase
in . . . pro se appeals filed in the Fourth Circuit since 1979” as a “likely factor” in the “remarka-
ble decrease in published opinions”).
131. Administrative Office data are not sufficiently granular to determine what percent-
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Figure 9132
With a few notable exceptions, those circuits handling the highest per-
centage of pro se litigation also issue more unpublished decisions. Figure 10
identifies the percentage of pro se appeals commenced in each circuit in the
year ending September 30, 2018.
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FIGURE 10133
Unsurprisingly, the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit saw the
highest overall percentage of pro se litigation. But the court with the next
highest percentage of pro se litigation—the Seventh Circuit—had one of the
highest publication rates among the circuits (the third highest in 2018). Only
the D.C. Circuit and the First Circuit surpassed the Seventh Circuit in per-
centage of published merits decisions in 2018—two circuits with significant-
ly lighter pro se dockets. Conversely, the Second Circuit, which had a very
high unpublication rate (90.5% in 2018), had among the lowest percentage of
pro se appeals. That suggests that pro se litigation may not be driving the
Second Circuit’s high unpublication rate. Even though the increase in pro se
litigation positively correlates with the increase in unpublished decisions na-
tionally, we should be mindful that correlation is not causation. Any number
of local customs or practices—many of which Marin Levy’s work chroni-
cles—might affect particular publication schemes.134
Finally, we might also expect the circuits that rely the most on un-
published decisions to move more swiftly, as conventional wisdom suggests
that unpublished decisions save judicial time and resources. That is true, for
the most part, as Figure 11 shows. But two circuits with high unpublication
133. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-9 (2018).
134 . See Levy, supra note 14, at 368–73 (examining circuits’ different case management
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rates (the Second and the Ninth) move more slowly than peer circuits with
high unpublication rates. And, it turns out, the converse is not necessarily
true: some courts with high publication rates—especially the Seventh Cir-
cuit—also move relatively quickly. Figure 11 charts the 2018 median circuit
disposition time in months from the notice of appeal to a merits decision.
Overall, although caseload volume remains high, and courts remain busy,135
they also appear to have adjusted to a new normal; their decisional times are
generally reasonable and even unexpectedly fast in some circuits (the Fourth
Circuit, for example).136 Most courts act relatively quickly, even those courts
with high caseload volumes per judge (e.g., the Eleventh Circuit). These me-
dian decision times suggest that, on balance, some courts may have privi-
leged speed and efficiency over decisional quality.
FIGURE 11137
135 . See supra Figure 4.
136. The Fourth Circuit resolved appeals more than twice as fast as several of its sister
circuits, and its disposition time is a full month and a half faster than the next most efficient
court. The Fourth Circuit’s speed may be aided by truncated briefing rules in pro se and non-
capital prisoner appeals, which shorten the briefing schedule and relieve the appellee of the
obligation to file a brief. 4TH CIR. R. 34(b).
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At bottom, empirical data complicate the popular efficiency narrative
that unpublished decisions are a needed solution to a widespread caseload
management problem. Our federal courts of appeals remain very busy, to be
sure, but they also increasingly rely on unpublished decisions despite a re-
duction in caseload volume over the last decade. And if, as I discuss in Part
III, we have any concerns over the decisional quality of unpublished deci-
sions, it also appears that many courts have time to do more. Indeed, some-
thing else may be afoot. Anecdotal, historical, and some empirical evidence
suggest that unpublished decisions—and the decisional atrophy that has
come with them—may reflect another kind of caseload “problem”: an ongo-
ing and continuing flood of appeals from pro se litigants.
No doubt, many pro se appeals present routine, meritless, and even po-
tentially frivolous issues.138 Perhaps a perfunctory decision is a proper sanc-
tion for a frivolous appeal. But other procedures exist to police frivolous
appeals.139 We must be cognizant that every pro se appeal involves a critical
touchpoint between vulnerable litigants and governmental authority—a
moment that calls for us to think carefully about the message unpublished
decisions send to the litigants who receive them. In the next Part, I turn to
the psychological procedural justice literature to begin that appraisal.
II. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE VALUES AND THE APPELLATE PROCESS
Although now freely citable in the federal appellate courts,140 un-
published decisions are not written for a public audience and do not serve a
lawmaking function. These are “letter[s] to the parties,” according to the
judges who issue them.141 Because unpublished decisions retain persuasive
value—at least insofar as the decision itself is persuasively reasoned—they
nevertheless do have public value.142 For present purposes, however, I will
take courts at their word that unpublished decisions serve a private audience
and are not intended for public scrutiny.143 If that’s true, we must evaluate
138. These categories are not equivalent. For example, meritless litigation—as opposed to
frivolous litigation—has systemic value. See Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation:
The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L. J. 1191, 1225–26 (2014) (describing what meritless
litigation contributes to law, including development and clarification of law and regulation of
behavior, among other contributions).
139 . See FED. R. APP. P. 38 (“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it
may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to
respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”). I am not advocating
that courts use Rule 38 more. I invoke Rule 38 only to point out that, if the courts are using
perfunctory decisions to discourage frivolous appeals from frequent filers, surely there is a
more direct—and, importantly, more transparent—means to accomplish that goal.
140. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
141. Kozinski, supra note 9, at 38.
142 . See supra note 79 (discussing precedential effect of unpublished decisions across
circuits).
143. I do not agree that unpublished decisions should receive no public scrutiny (nor that
they are intended solely for a private audience). But I do not need to take on that issue to de-
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unpublished decisions by a different yardstick: our assessment should con-
sider the subjective experience of the litigant who receives the unpublished
decision in response to her appeal. That is the kind of inquiry that the law
and psychology literature on procedural justice affords.144 This Part explores
core procedural justice experiences and how they might map onto the appel-
late process.
I am mindful of the thoughtful critique of psychological procedural jus-
tice work from criminal justice scholars and critical race theorists.145 That
scholarship has illuminated how a focus on procedural fairness and fair
treatment may obscure (and worse, further) systemic inequality and struc-
tural ostracization, thwart systemic change, and undervalue the effects of
substantive outcomes on the system’s most vulnerable participants.146 I am
not tackling substantive outcomes here, nor do I intend to suggest that rea-
son-giving might be a fix (either partial or complete) for any of these deeply
troubling issues. One problem with unpublished decisions, however, is their
potential to marginalize, adding to the grave systemic and structural injus-
tices that many litigants on the receiving end of these decisions already face.
So, ultimately, my claim is far more limited: how appellate courts treat vul-
nerable litigants should trouble us, regardless of the outcome in any particu-
lar case. Decisions devoid of any positive procedural justice experiences
carry the potential to inflict harm; they marginalize vulnerable litigants seek-
ing relief in a court that is, effectively, their last resort. Reason-giving, I will
argue, is one way to create a fairer, more humanizing process, even if it will
not address structural inequities or change outcomes.
If this is, as I suggest, a worthy goal, then psychological procedural jus-
tice literature can provide us with a window into how litigants might receive
appellate decisions and be affected by appellate process. As Rebecca Hol-
lander-Blumoff details, psychological research has “provided robust empiri-
fend my thesis. We can presume that courts write in good faith for a private audience while
questioning whether those private “letters” disserve procedural justice values.
144 . See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 134 (2011) (“For psychologists, measuring subjective perceptions
of procedural justice is important because this measurement captures individuals’ real experi-
ences of fairness or unfairness of the legal system, as opposed to the effects that the system’s
architects might think or expect to be likely products of the system’s structure and rules.”).
145. The procedural justice frame can mask structural injustices and, at worst, imply rac-
ist conceptions of criminality—especially in the context of police–citizen contact. See Bell, su-
pra note 35, at 2061 (“Deploying legitimacy theory and procedural justice as a diagnosis and
solution to the current policing crisis might even imply, at some level, that the problem of po-
licing is better understood as a result of African American criminality than as a badge and in-
cident of race- and class-based subjugation.”).
146 . See id . at 2081–82 (discussing critiques of procedural justice’s legitimacy theory for
policing) (citing Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of
Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1468 (2016); Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control,
and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171,
189 (2005); and William J. Stuntz, Essay, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137,
2174 (2002)).
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cal evidence that individuals care deeply about the fairness of the process by
which decisions are made, apart from considerations about the outcome of
the decision.”147 That is not to say that outcomes are irrelevant to litigants,
but it is to say that the treatment litigants receive matters independently.148
This is an especially important observation in the context of appellate pro-
cess, where appellants frequently lose and where some kinds of appellants
almost always lose.149
Tom R. Tyler’s influential work has identified four primary considera-
tions that contribute to an individual’s judgment about the fairness of the
process she receives.150 Those include: “(1) how much voice and opportunity
to be heard the party believes she has experienced, (2) neutrality of the fo-
rum, (3) the trustworthiness of the decisionmaker, and (4) the degree to
which the individual has been treated with dignity and respect.”151 Although
other considerations may affect a person’s subjective experience of justice,
these experiences are core to the perception of a fair decisionmaking pro-
cess.152
The first of these experiences—voice and opportunity to be heard—
generally accords with normative procedural justice theory.153 Tyler’s re-
search suggests that the extent of one’s participation is “an important deter-
147. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 144, at 132. Originally, researchers believed people
cared about procedural justice because people really cared about outcomes. Id . at 131. Later
work has suggested that procedural justice matters because fair treatment by authority figures
affects self-esteem and improves group value, or because people find it difficult to assess out-
comes and depend on process as a heuristic for form judgments about the outcome received.
Id . at 137.
148 . See id . at 137 (citing Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relational Model of Authority
in Groups, 22 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 143–44 (1992)).
149. In the year ending September 30, 2017, the reversal rate across all federal courts of
appeals was 9.4%; the reversal rate in federal prisoner appeals was 3.9%; the reversal rate in
nonfederal prisoner appeals was 4.9%. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-5 (2017).
150. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 121
(2000).
151. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 144, at 135 (citing Tyler, supra note 150, at 121).
152 . Id .; see also TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 36, at 73 (noting that
citizens are responsive not only to outcomes but also “to their own judgments about the fair-
ness of the way . . . judges make decisions”). Tyler’s work originally relied on data gathered in
the late 1980s in Chicago, but he has since replicated his results with nationalized data from
2012. See Tom R. Tyler, Understanding the Force of Law, 51 TULSA L. REV. 507, 511 (2016)
(book review) (discussing Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exer-
cise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL’Y & L. 78 (2014)).
153 . See, e .g ., Solum, supra note 33, at 280 (arguing that without “participation rights,”
including the right to be told the reasons for a decision, a litigant “cannot be assured that the
proceeding considered [her] view of the law and facts”); see also Hollander-Blumoff, supra note
144, at 143 (“From a theoretical perspective, the explanations for why procedural justice and
procedural due process matter largely dovetail, falling into one of two camps, instrumental or
dignitary.”).
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minant of whether people feel that procedural justice has occurred.”154 Sig-
nificantly, individuals appear to value participation even when “they are
aware that their participation will not meaningfully affect the decision.”155
Tyler’s work also suggests that “[a]uthorities can enhance the acceptance
of their decisions by the way they present them to affected parties.”156 He
suggests that a judge tell litigants that “the citizen’s views were considered
but (unfortunately) could not influence the decision made.”157 What is im-
portant (according to Tyler) is that a litigant believes her voice has been con-
sidered, regardless of her actual ability to affect the outcome.158
As for the neutrality and trustworthiness of the decisionmaker, “the
quality of decision making” plays a pivotal role in individual perceptions of
procedural fairness.159 “People think that decisions are being more fairly
made when authorities are neutral and unbiased and make their decisions
using objective indicators, not their personal views.”160 Thus, “evidence of
even-handedness and objectivity” is important, but so too is “openness and
explanation, because it provides [the court] an opportunity to communicate
evidence that [its] decision making is neutral.”161 Similarly, people are more
trusting of the motives of decisionmakers when “they feel they can under-
stand” the decisions.162
Reasoned explanations matter not only as an indicator of trustworthi-
ness and neutrality but also as a sign of dignity and respect.163 Again, Tyler’s
descriptive work comports with normative assessments of fair process.
154 . See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 144, at 135.
155 . Id . at 136.
156. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 36, at 149.
157 . Id .
158 . Id . at 149–50 (noting that procedural justice effects are maintained “only if citizens
believe that their concerns are being considered by decision-making authorities. If their views
are not considered, citizens will not believe that authorities are attempting to deal with them in
a reasonable way, and long-term allegiance will be called into question” (citation omitted)).
159. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 36, at 298; see also HENRY M. HART, JR.
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 143–52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (describing “reasoned
elaboration” as cornerstone of legal process).
160. Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 36, at 298.
161 . Id .
162 . Id . at 299. From a normative perspective, the obligation of reason-giving has been
explored in a number of ways, including (1) as a feature of the theory of precedent, Frederick
Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636–37 (1995); (2) as a “reasoned elaboration”
requirement in the process of adjudication, see Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 412; (3) as an as-
pect of procedural justice, Mashaw, Reasoned Administration, supra note 29, at 103; and (4) as
one of the requirements of the judicial duty of candor, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Essay, A The-
ory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265 (2017). For a deeply thoughtful comparative
analysis of the role of reason-giving in judicial decisionmaking, see Mathilde Cohen, When
Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 483, 505 (2015).
163. Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 36, at 299.
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Scholars who have endorsed the dignitary view of procedure likewise have
long recognized that procedure serves many functions, including, as Judith
Resnik has said, “to instruct about and to act out the political system, to le-
gitimate decisions of the state, to dignify the participants, and to make
meaningful the interaction between individuals and the state.”164 “Being sub-
ject to judicial authority that is unreasoned is to be treated as a mere object
of the law or of the political power, not a subject with independent rational
capacities.”165 As Frederick Schauer has explained: “[G]iving reasons is . . . a
way of showing respect for the subject, and a way of opening a conversation
rather than forestalling one.”166
There has been little work exploring the experience of procedural justice
in the specific context of appellate litigation.167 That is a gap that needs fill-
ing, and it cautions against too much extrapolation based on Tyler’s trial-
level work. That said, therapeutic justice scholars have seized on Tyler’s ob-
servations to attack the “per curiam affirmance”—the one-word decision
(“affirmed”).168 Amy Ronner and the late Bruce Winick have observed that
dismissive appellate decisions leave appellants “with the feeling (correct or
incorrect) that the court did not take the contentions made (at considerable
expense) with any degree of seriousness.”169
164. Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 619 (1985). Jerry
Mashaw has explored extensively the potential dignitary value of participation. See Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885,
886 (1981) (arguing that the “effects of process on participants” matters in “judging the legiti-
macy of public decisionmaking”); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 172–82 (1985).
165. Cohen, supra note 162, at 505 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 426).
166. Schauer, supra note 162, at 658. Reason-giving “is the antithesis of authority. When
the voice of authority fails, the voice of reason emerges. Or vice versa. . . . And reasons are what
we typically avoid when the assertion of authority is thought independently important.” Id . at
637.
167. Dan Simon and Nicholas Scurich have done empirical work to measure laypeople’s
sensitivity to judicial decisionmaking and reason-giving. See Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich,
Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision Making, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 709 (2011). Their
study concludes that people are relatively indifferent to judicial reasoning when they agree
with the court’s decision, but they are sensitive to judicial reasoning when they disagree with
the decision. Id . at 719. Perhaps surprisingly, laypeople preferred decisions that offered no rea-
sons to those that offered a curt reason for a result. Id . Simon and Scurich’s work does not take
into account the subjective experience of litigants themselves.
168. Amy D. Ronner & Bruce J. Winick, Silencing the Appellant’s Voice: The Antithera-
peutic Per Curiam Affirmance, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 499, 500–01 (2000) (discussing work of
Tyler, among others).
169 . Id . at 500; see id . at 505 (advocating decisionmaking that “sen[ds] [the appellant] a
message that the court heard his voice, giving him a form of validation”); see also Bruce J. Win-
ick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 37, 48 (1999). I am mindful of the well-founded critiques of the therapeutic justice field,
especially its ambiguous terminology and lack of theoretical precision. See, e .g ., E. Lea John-
ston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 531–35 (2012); Mae C.
Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the Crim-
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The limited descriptive work available on the subjective experience of
appealing parties confirms the insights drawn from Tyler’s broader project.
Scott Barclay interviewed 125 civil litigants about their expectations in the
appellate process as part of a project exploring clashes between lawyers and
clients.170 Although his work involved represented litigants, one theme that
emerged was that litigants were not as outcome focused on appeal as their
lawyers.171 While readily acknowledging that taking an appeal was a long
shot, or even a losing battle, appellants pursued appeals for “other goals”—
including “retribution, storytelling and participating in changing the sys-
tem.”172 Some perceived “justice” not as success in their particular case, but
as “a change in approach in future cases for similarly-situated litigants.”173 It
was “the ability to tell their stories in court, not in some other forum, that
[was] critical”; the litigant who takes an appeal—even one she knows she will
very likely lose—does so “in order to have her story taken seriously by the
decisionmakers in her case.”174
Undoubtedly, not every appellant approaches her appeal with these
goals in mind, and the appellant’s expectations as to reason-giving may vary
depending on the extent of process received at the trial court level. But Ty-
ler’s work gives us a reason to believe that the process afforded individual
litigants at the appellate stage may have independent significance. More
broadly, Tyler argues that the experience of procedural fairness is “the pri-
mary factor mediating the impact [of an individual’s] experience on views
about [judicial or legal] legitimacy.”175 When “people feel unfairly treated
when they deal with legal authorities, they then view the authorities as less
legitimate and as a consequence obey the law less frequently in their every-
day lives.”176 Natural persons, as opposed to the corporate appellants who
dominate the first tier, may be more affected by these experiences.177 And
society’s most vulnerable members—including the poor and the prisoners
who often proceed pro se on appeal178—may experience procedural justice
inal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV.
539, 547–50 (2007).
170. Scott Barclay, A New Aspect of Lawyer-Client Interactions: Lawyers Teaching Process-
Focused Clients to Think About Outcomes, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 1 (2004).
171 . Id . at 10 (observing that lawyers, as they are ethically obligated, “focus upon the like-
ly outcomes of legal claims,” while their clients “appear to focus on various aspects of the litiga-
tion process rather than legal outcomes”).
172 . Id . at 5, 9.
173 . Id . at 9.
174 . Id . at 8.
175. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 36, at 107.
176 . Id . at 108.
177 . See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 144, at 148–49.
178. For those who are incarcerated, the appellate process affords an opportunity for
what Alexandra Lahav has termed “recognition respect.” Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Liti-
gation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1670–71 (2016) (asserting that litigation
can be understood as a performance of self-government and that recognition respect is a core
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failures more acutely, as they injure self-esteem and threaten group inclu-
sion.179
We need not agree, however, that procedural justice failures at the ap-
pellate stage threaten judicial legitimacy to see that those failures neverthe-
less carry the potential to marginalize. Because there are so few touchpoints
between litigants and the court during the appellate process, what courts say
to the appealing party may be especially important. Decisions that fail to
show appellants respect, to further basic dignitary aims, and to demonstrate
the independence of the decisionmaker from the district court send a clear
message: You and your problems are not worth the court’s time. It’s not hard
to imagine the marginalizing effect of those decisions, even when the out-
come on appeal is beyond dispute.
III. A PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TAXONOMY OF UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS
Both the extent of appellate process and the quality of the unpublished
decision are likely to affect the procedural justice experience of litigants in
the appellate justice system. A focus on these critical experiences draws our
attention to both the extent of participation afforded the appellant during
the appellate process and the extent of reasons given in unpublished deci-
sions, which signal the court’s respect for the litigant as well as its independ-
ence, trustworthiness, and neutrality.180
These two focal points—participation and reason-giving—return our at-
tention to the interplay between first-tier and second-tier appellate justice.181
First-tier appellate process involves oral argument and judicial scrutiny.182
Second-tier process, on the other hand, involves no oral argument and little
judicial oversight, as staff attorneys do the heavy lifting.183 First-tier appeals
attribute of that performance). Because a prisoner has lost many legal rights through incarcera-
tion, “the right to file a court action might be said to be his remaining most ‘fundamental polit-
ical right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.’ ” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153
(1992) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
179 . See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 36, at 176.
180 . See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text (discussing Tyler’s work on proce-
dural justice values and identifying core values and experiences).
181 . See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text (discussing Richman and Reynolds’s
work on first-tier and second-tier appellate justice); see also Richman & Reynolds, supra note
12, at 275–76 (describing two-track system of modern federal appellate decisionmaking); see
also Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 12, at 1668 & n.2 (following Richman and Reynolds’s two-
track approach).
182. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 281–82; see also POSNER, supra note 21, at
162–63 (observing that circuit staff attorneys generally do not draft opinions or work up cases
argued orally; the Seventh Circuit is an exception).
183 . See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 290; see also Levy, supra note 14, at 345–
46 (“In many of the cases that are not tracked for argument, staff attorneys ‘work up’ the case,
meaning that they prepare a memorandum and draft a disposition.”). Judges rarely meet in
person to discuss “second-tier” cases (either with each other or with the staff attorney who
worked it up), and they usually vote on an outcome after reviewing the material in a serial
fashion on their own. See id . at 344–53 (describing process for nonargument cases in D.C. Cir-
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often, but not always, end in published, reasoned decisions; second-tier ap-
peals almost always end in unpublished decisions.184 These distinct processes
inform any procedural justice assessment of unpublished decisions.
“First-tier” appeals—those that benefit from judicial attention and oral
argument—are likely to have positive procedural justice effects, as litigants
are able to participate more actively in the appellate process through oral ar-
gument. In “second-tier” appeals, however, the only procedural justice expe-
rience between the litigant and the court is the decision itself. Because of the
difference in process, reason-giving is arguably even more important in sec-
ond-tier unpublished decisions; it is the court’s only opportunity to convey
that the party has been heard and that the court has acted independently,
neutrally, and respectfully.
In this Part, I classify four types of unpublished decisions: the publisha-
ble decision, the memo decision, the avoidant decision, and the Kafkaesque
decision.185 This taxonomy focuses on those features of the process that may
enhance or undermine procedural justice experiences. It categorizes un-
published decisions by the quality of their reason-giving and the extent of
process that produced each decision (that is, whether the appeal received
“first-tier” or “second-tier” treatment).
A. The Publishable Decision
The publishable decision is just that: a decision that could have, and ar-
guably should have, been published. These are decisions that look like law-
making decisions; they often satisfy the various criteria for publication,
cuit, First Circuit, Second Circuit, Third Circuit, and Fourth Circuit; in only the D.C. Circuit,
which has the lowest number of appeals of the five, did judges meet with staff attorneys to dis-
cuss nonargument cases); see also POSNER, supra note 21, at 166–67 (staff attorneys meet with
judges in Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit as well).
184 . See Levy, supra note 14, at 363–64 (observing that “[a]lmost all of the published
opinions in all of the circuits come from cases that are calendared for oral argument” even
though some of those appeals “ultimately are decided solely on the briefs”).
185. Although this taxonomy is the first of its kind, others have described the content of
unpublished decisions in similar terms. In Pether’s posthumous work, she says in a footnote:
Nonprecedential opinions take three forms: (i) those which give reasons for the court’s
decision that make them virtually indistinguishable from precedential opinions, except
to the extent that they may be, in some jurisdictions, characteristically briefer, (ii) short
opinions with circular reasoning, essentially saying “we affirm the trial court’s decision
because the appellant doesn’t fit within the relevant rule”; and (iii) the so-called
AWOPs (Affirmed Without Opinion), or one-word opinions reversing the court below.
Penelope Pether, Strange Fruit: What Happened to the United States Doctrine of Precedent?, 60
VILL. L. REV. 443, 450 n.51 (2015).
My taxonomy differs in that I group (ii) and (iii) as functionally similar, and then I subdi-
vide that larger category based on whether the appeal received oral argument (i.e., first-tier
treatment), which is an important procedural justice consideration. I also carve out a new cate-
gory of presumptively superior unpublished decisions, the memo decision, which is responsive
to an appellant’s arguments on appeal but may not have the detail of a precedential decision—a
category that presumably is part of Pether’s group (i).
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including reversing the decision below, discussing a legal or factual issue of
public interest, establishing a new rule of law, modifying an existing rule of
law, or applying an established rule in a novel context.186 That such decisions
are not published may be alarming and suggestive of unpublication games-
manship.187 But, for present purposes, these decisions are superior to other
kinds of unpublished decisions because they have the greatest procedural
justice effects.
A prototypical—and somewhat infamous188—example is the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Austin v . Plumley.189 In that decision, the Fourth Circuit
vacated and remanded a district court decision that had denied a writ of ha-
beas corpus to a West Virginia prisoner who claimed he was entitled to a
presumption of judicial vindictiveness during his resentencing.190 The vaca-
tur of a denial of habeas corpus relief is an exceptional outcome; that same
year, the Fourth Circuit reversed less than 3% of state prisoner petitions like
Mr. Austin’s.191 The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Austin was eighteen pages
long, and, according to the court, involved a “unique scenario” of “first im-
pression.”192 It even drew a (short) dissent.193 Nevertheless, it was not pub-
lished.
Austin sparked a dissent from the denial of certiorari from Justice
Thomas when West Virginia sought review in the Supreme Court.194 In ad-
dition to criticizing the Fourth Circuit on the merits, Justice Thomas, joined
by Justice Scalia, also faulted the court for hiding its reasoning and result in
an unpublished decision: “It is hard to imagine a reason that the Court of
Appeals would not have published this opinion except to avoid creating
186 . See, e .g ., 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 32.1(b) (describing criteria for publication).
187. More benevolently, these cases may implicate the concerns with decisionmaking in
multimember courts that Cass Sunstein highlighted in Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incom-
pletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). See also infra note 200 (discuss-
ing Sunstein’s work on decisionmaking by multimember bodies).
188 . See, e .g ., Adam Liptak, Courts Write Decisions that Elude Long View, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/us/justice-clarence-thomas-court-
decisions-that-set-no-precedent.html [https://perma.cc/7NVM-HZXV]; Richard M. Re, On
Not Creating Precedent in Plumley v. Austin, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 2, 2015, 11:33 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/02/on-not-creating-precedent-in-plumley-v-
austin.html [https://perma.cc/835V-P2P5]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Are Some Opinions Un-
published to Avoid Review? Thomas Dissent Highlights the Issue, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 4, 2015, 6:15
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/are_some_opinions_unpublished_to_avoid
_review_thomas_dissent_highlights_the/ [https://perma.cc/VV67-5AV8].
189. 565 F. App’x 175 (4th Cir. 2014).
190 . Austin, 565 F. App’x at 187, 190–91.
191. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-5 (2014).
192 . Austin, 565 F. App’x at 186.
193 . Id . at 193 (Shedd, J., dissenting).
194. Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
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binding law for the Circuit.”195 According to Justice Thomas, under either
the Fourth Circuit’s own publication rules or “any standard” for publication,
Austin should have been published.196
Austin v . Plumley is also an excellent example of something else: a judi-
cial Pygmalion of sorts. It is an appeal that may have been destined for sec-
ond-tier treatment—an appeal from the denial of habeas corpus relief, a
routine event in the federal appellate courts. But perhaps an industrious staff
attorney, law clerk, or judge uncovered a compelling issue while screening
the appeal. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit appointed counsel on appeal for Mr.
Austin and heard oral argument, transforming the appeal into one fit for
first-tier treatment in all respects—except for the court’s surprising (and
perhaps inexplicable)197 failure to designate its decision for publication.
The publishable decision thus is any unpublished decision that employs
reasoned elaboration substantially similar to a lawmaking decision. These
decisions are the product of first-tier appellate process, including full brief-
ing and oral argument. Some publishable decisions will draw a dissent or
concurrence—another indicator of the decision’s publication-worthiness. In
short, the publishable decision is an unpublished decision that really should
have been published. From a procedural justice standpoint, these decisions
may be as satisfying as any published decision, given the remote possibility
that the litigant affords any significance to the publication decision itself.
Publishable decisions are surely problematic for other reasons, but for pre-
sent purposes they are not.
B. The Memo Decision
When the courts of appeals began issuing unpublished decisions, they
likely had what I categorize as the memo decision in mind: a relatively short,
yet nevertheless responsive, appellate decision.198 The memo decision is a de-
195 . Id . at 831. The strategic implications of the publishable decision are beyond the
scope of this Article, and the topic has been cogently examined elsewhere. See Ben Grunwald,
Strategic Publication, 92 TUL. L. REV. 745 (2018) (arguing that a divided panel might utilize
“strategic publication” as a bargaining tool in reaching a decision).
196 . Austin, 135 S. Ct. at 831 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court’s more conservative
justices are not the only ones to have voiced concern about the temptation to use selective pub-
lication to hide appellate decisions from further review. Justice Blackmun expressed concern
over the practice in 1991, and Justice Stevens worried about it in 2006. See Liptak, supra note
188.
197. Justice Thomas appears to have correctly concluded that the decision satisfied the
Fourth Circuit’s publication standard. The Fourth Circuit will publish decisions “only if the
opinion satisfies one or more of the standards for publication,” which include a decision that
“establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies or explains a rule of law” within the Fourth Circuit. 4TH
CIR. R. 36(a). Austin likely satisfied this standard, which the vacatur itself suggests (if not com-
pels).
198. Indeed, in a 1968 memorandum to the Federal Judicial Center, Chief Judge Clement
Haynsworth originally described the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision as a “succinct[]”
decision that would “always adequately[] state[] the facts, the contentions, and the reasons for
the conclusion,” even when the appeal was “frivolous.” Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State
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cision that (1) identifies the issues on appeal and (2) explains why the appel-
lant’s arguments succeed or (more often) fail. It is self-contained and self-
referential; the public and the litigants can understand (and evaluate the cor-
rectness of) the order on its face (even if we must consult cited law). But, im-
portantly, memo decisions issue without the benefit of oral argument; these
are, quintessentially, second-tier appeals. Unlike the Kafkaesque decision dis-
cussed below, however, these decisions have some positive procedural justice
effects.
Here is a good example of a memo decision from the Eleventh Circuit in
a second-tier, pro se appeal. I quote this decision at length to set up an im-
portant contrast with the other categories of decisions:
Martha Edgerton appeals pro se the summary judgment in favor of the
City of Plantation and against her complaint of employment discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, and retaliation. Edgerton argues that she presented
sufficient evidence of pervasive racial and sexual harassment to support her
complaint of a hostile work environment and of retaliation. We affirm.
We review a summary judgment de novo. . . .
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee with respect to the “terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of” her race or sex. To establish a
prima facie case of a hostile work environment, an employee must prove
that she belongs to a protected group; that she has been subject to unwel-
come harassment; that the harassment was based on a protected ground,
such as race or sex; that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to
alter the terms and conditions of her employment; and that her employer is
responsible for the harassment under a theory of vicarious or direct liabil-
ity. The requirement that the harassment be “severe or pervasive” contains
both an objective and a subjective component. “Thus, to be actionable, this
behavior must result in both an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive and an environment that the victim subjec-
tively perceives . . . to be abusive.” In evaluating the objective severity of the
alleged harassment, we consider the frequency of the conduct; its severity;
whether the conduct was threatening or humiliating, or was instead an iso-
lated offensive utterance; and whether the conduct unreasonably interfered
with the employee’s performance. . . .
. . . .
The district court committed no reversible error when it entered
summary judgment in favor of the City and against Edgerton’s complaint
Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1095 (4th Cir. 1972) (appending Chief Judge Haynsworth’s memoran-
dum); see id . (“[T]he case is affirmed, reversed, or remanded by a memorandum decision,
which quite sufficiently states the facts, the contentions, and the Court’s resolution of the legal
questions presented . . . .” (alteration in original)); see also ROMAN L. HRUSKA ET AL., COMM’N
ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 258 (1975) (“[W]e recommend
that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require that in every case there be some record,
however brief, and whatever the form, of the reasoning which impelled the decision.”).
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of racial and sexual harassment. Edgerton alleged that she was racially or
sexually harassed at most about once a month, but several of the alleged in-
cidents were not harassing. For example, Edgerton complained, “Robert
Krogman aggressively confronted me at the copier/printer workstation area
by physically snatching papers from my hand.” She also alleged that Krog-
man called her to his cubicle and showed her a “pin-up” of his wife in a bi-
kini. And Edgerton alleged that “Mr. Jones made a comment that, you
know, ‘The founding fathers paved the way for people in this country.”
Edgerton also complained that Richard Maher left a Rosemary plant on her
desk and said, “Now you have to date me.” And she complained about
overhearing Jones tell a crew worker that he was “dicking around,” but
Edgerton offered no evidence that Jones’s comments were directed toward
her. Edgerton was never threatened. Any offensive conduct was isolated
and appears to have occurred during a relatively small part of her workday.
These incidents do not establish a hostile work environment.
. . . .
Edgerton also argues for the first time that she received ineffective as-
sistance of counsel and that the City engaged in misconduct before the dis-
trict court, but we ordinarily will not review arguments raised for the first
time on appeal. And no exception to that general rule applies here.
AFFIRMED.199
In this decision, the Eleventh Circuit has concisely explained the nature
of the case, the issues on appeal, the governing law, and the application of
that law to key facts. Ms. Edgerton will know why she lost: the conduct of
which she complained did not satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s hostile work en-
vironment test because the conduct was neither severe enough nor pervasive
enough; the other issues were raised too late. Ms. Edgerton will know the ba-
sis of the court’s decision from reading the face of the opinion, and so, too,
would any member of the public who stumbles upon the court’s decision.
Indeed, the public might even learn something from the case—namely, that
conduct like what the court described is not unlawful in the workplace.
Memo decisions, therefore, (1) identify the issues on appeal; (2) state the
relevant legal rules that govern those issues; and (3) explain how those gov-
erning rules apply to key facts. These decisions disclose at least some of the
court’s own reasoning and can stand on their own, without reference to the
district court’s decision. But, unlike publishable decisions, these are cases
that (1) do not benefit from oral argument; (2) provide a shorter, more per-
functory analysis; and (3) have no concurrence or dissent. The procedural
justice effects of these decisions may not be as great as the publishable deci-
sion—in part, because oral argument has not occurred—but they do demon-
strate responsiveness to the appellant and respect for her arguments. These
decisions arguably demonstrate some independence from the district court
199. Edgerton v. City of Plantation, 682 F. App’x 748 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal citations
omitted).
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by offering the appellant a direct and (somewhat) responsive answer to her
appeal. These decisions are the gold standard for second-tier appeals.
C. The Avoidant Decision
Not all unpublished decisions look like the one the Eleventh Circuit is-
sued in Ms. Edgerton’s appeal. Many say far less. These facially under-
reasoned decisions do little to advance procedural justice values—unless the
litigant benefited from another procedural justice experience (e.g., oral ar-
gument) along the way. These next two Sections describe unpublished deci-
sions that, standing on their own, may marginalize litigants by failing to
engage in responsive and independent reason-giving during the appellate
process. What separates the two categories, however, is whether they are the
product of first-tier appellate process—an experience that can offset an oth-
erwise poor procedural justice experience.
Courts issue what I describe as “facially under-reasoned” decisions in
different contexts. These are decisions that fail to provide the basic infor-
mation provided in the memo decision (issues, relevant law, simple applica-
tion of law to key facts). By describing these decisions as “under-reasoned,” I
do not imply that these decisions are ill-informed or even wrong; rather, that
label describes the failure of the issuing court to disclose any independent
reasoning or issue a facially comprehensible decision. The only way to deci-
pher “under-reasoned” decisions is by way of reference to another deci-
sionmaker’s (the district court’s or administrative law judge’s) decision.
As indicated, I think there are two very different kinds of under-
reasoned unpublished decisions that serve markedly different purposes: one
decision—the avoidant decision—serves to avoid; another—the Kafkaesque
decision—serves to dismiss. The avoidant decision issues in appeals in which
we might have expected the court to issue a published (or at least a publisha-
ble) decision, but the court ultimately hides its work—and perhaps inten-
tionally so.200
A good example is the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Henry v . City of Mt .
Dora.201 Henry involved the question whether Heck v . Humphrey202 bars ac-
tions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a writ of habeas corpus is not available as
200. I do not ascribe a negative connotation to intentionality. The dynamics of a multi-
member appellate panel may make it much more difficult to reach consensus on reasons in
some cases—a challenge that district court judges do not face. Cass Sunstein has identified
“special problems of public justification” that arise in the context of multimember judicial bod-
ies like the federal courts of appeals. Sunstein, supra note 187, at 1746. In such bodies, he con-
tends that incompletely theorized agreements have a significant advantage, for they “allow[] a
convergence on particular outcomes by people unable to reach anything like an accord on gen-
eral principles.” Id . Sunstein explains further that incompletely theorized agreements allow
judges to live with one another and show each other “a measure of reciprocity and mutual re-
spect.” Id . Judges, “perhaps even more than ordinary people,” might rightly avoid directly chal-
lenging “one another’s deepest and most defining commitments.” Id . at 1746–47.
201. 688 F. App’x 842 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert . denied, 138 S. Ct. 676 (2018).
202. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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a federal constitutional attack on a state criminal conviction (in that case, a
juvenile adjudication).203 That issue is a complex one that had split the feder-
al circuits six to four.204 On March 30, 2016, an Eleventh Circuit panel heard
oral argument in Henry.205 Sixteen months later, the panel resolved the ap-
peal like this: “Having heard oral argument and carefully reviewed the rec-
ord, we find no reversible error in the district court’s order dismissing
plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest claims against the above officers. We therefore
AFFIRM the district court’s order of dismissal.”206 Whatever caused the de-
lay—perhaps panel disagreement over how to approach the issue—the court
resolved the dispute without saying much of anything.
The Eleventh Circuit is not the only court to use under-reasoned, non-
precedential decisions as a judicial shortcut in novel, important, or complex
cases.207 Nearly a decade ago, the hot issue in Justice Sotomayor’s Senate
confirmation process was her participation in Ricci v . DeStefano,208 a sum-
mary decision by the Second Circuit affirming—“substantially for the rea-
sons stated” by the district court—the rejection of a reverse discrimination
suit brought by white New Haven firefighters.209 The case had been orally
argued, was high-profile, and involved controversial reverse discrimination
law. At the rehearing stage, other members of the Second Circuit called the
panel to task for hiding the basis of the decision (or avoiding thorny is-
sues).210
Avoidant decisions thus are facially under-reasoned decisions in first-tier
appeals. The avoidant decision bears the features of ordinary appellate pro-
cess, including oral argument and counsel (appointed, where necessary). But
the resulting decision says very little, and may slip below the radar as a per-
functory unpublished decision—perhaps precisely as the “avoidant” panel
intended. Although these decisions may lack the hallmarks of independent
judicial thought, trustworthiness, and neutrality (because the court of ap-
peals has not sufficiently explained its result), the process that has been af-
203. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Henry v. City of Mt. Dora, 688 F. App’x 842 (11th
Cir. 2017) (No. 17-652).
204 . See id . at i, 11, 16.
205. Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Henry v. Livingston,
138 S. Ct. 676 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-652), 2017 WL 5991760.
206. Henry, 688 F. App’x at 842. In four sentences, the court also explained the nature of
the underlying claims. Id .
207 . See, e .g ., In re Complaint of Omega Protein, Inc. v. Brumfield, 672 F. App’x 510 (5th
Cir. 2017).
208. 264 F. App’x 106 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
209 . See Grunwald, supra note 195, at 746–48 (discussing controversy over the Ricci deci-
sion).
210. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 94–96 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes, J., dissenting). The
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Henry issued without remark; the Henry appellants sought re-
hearing en banc, but no active Eleventh Circuit judge requested the requisite court poll. Henry
v. City of Mt. Dora, No. 15-11351-CC (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2017) (order denying petition for re-
hearing en banc).
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forded to the appellant may have an offsetting procedural justice benefit.
Like the publishable decision, avoidant decisions may also be problematic
for other reasons, but they are not as troubling on the procedural justice
scale as the final category of decision: the Kafkaesque decision.
D. The Kafkaesque Decision
The worst of the worst is the Kafkaesque decision. That term captures the
central feature of these decisions: Kafkaesque decisions are largely unex-
plained; they may point in circular directions (back to the district court); and
they are issued by seemingly anonymous bureaucrats (judges on a remote
appellate panel) in a seemingly indifferent fashion.211 Although the avoidant
decision discussed above is similarly cursory, it is less anonymous (issued
after oral argument) and may further systemic values by deferring tricky is-
sues. With the Kafkaesque decision, the upshot is pure efficiency and the
message is quite different: “You lose because we say so.” These decisions ap-
pear to further no procedural justice value; they are an exercise in rote dock-
et clearing.
It is easiest to spot Kafkaesque decisionmaking in the wholly unreasoned
decision—the one-word affirmance (“affirmed”). The Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts tracks such decisions as those issued “without comment.”
In the year ending September 30, 2018, half of the Eighth Circuit’s212 merits
decisions were issued “unsigned, without comment.”213 No other circuit even
came close to the Eighth Circuit’s numbers; the Third Circuit reports the
next largest number of “without comment” decisions, but it only issued such
decisions eighty-five times (out of 1,778, or 4.6%).214
211 . See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 83 (David Wyllie trans., Dover Publications 2009)
(1925) (“[T]he first documents [filed with the court] would be very important . . . . Unfortu-
nately, though, . . . the first documents submitted are sometimes not even read by the court. . . .
[They] are usually mislaid or lost completely, and even if they do keep them right to the end
they are hardly read . . . . This is all very regrettable, but not entirely without its justifications.”);
see also Jon Connolly & Marc D. Falkoff, Habeas, Informational Asymmetries, and the War on
Terror, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (2011) (“[W]e now use the adjective ‘Kafka-
esque’ to describe a situation in which an individual is trapped in a seemingly capricious sys-
tem that refuses to explain or justify itself, and over which he is powerless. The central feature
of the Kafkaesque scenario [is] being trapped by an opaque authority that reveals no infor-
mation . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
212. In the Eighth Circuit, the court may use its summary procedures when: (1) judg-
ment “is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous”; (2) a jury’s verdict is sup-
ported by sufficient evidence; (3) an administrative order is supported by substantial evidence;
and (4) no error of law exists. 8TH CIR. R. 47B. A summary decision can—but need not—say
anything more than “AFFIRMED.” Id .
213. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2018).
214 . Id . The year before—the year ending September 30, 2017—the Ninth Circuit issued
1,184 of its 7,456 merits decisions (or 15.9%) “without comment.” JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12
(2017). But in 2018, it reported issuing no “without comment” merits decisions. JUDICIAL
BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2018). So, too, did three other circuits: the D.C. Circuit; the Fourth Circuit,
and the Tenth Circuit. Id .
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Those numbers suggest that the Kafkaesque decision may be isolated to
the Eighth Circuit. But the numbers deceive.215 What some circuits report as
“without comment” decisions, others may describe as “reasoned” (also the
Administrative Office’s term).216 The Administrative Office defines “rea-
soned” decisions as those that “expound the law as applied to the facts of the
case and detail the judicial reasons upon which the judgment is based”; alt-
hough the Administrative Office does not define “without comment” deci-
sions, presumably that category includes only decisions that do not meet this
threshold.217 Regardless, circuits self-report data, raising questions as to the
reliability of these statistics (which the following discussion underscores).218
For present purposes, the distinction between “reasoned” and “without
comment” is what separates the memo decision from the Kafkaesque decision
in my taxonomy. Only those decisions that evidence some form of inde-
pendent appellate decisionmaking—that is, decisions that identify the issues
on appeal, explain controlling law, and apply that law to key facts—are fa-
cially “reasoned” appellate decisions. Those decisions that do not satisfy
these requirements are not facially reasoned. I emphasize “facially” because
the court’s decision may in fact be fully reasoned, but the court has chosen
not to make those reasons public.
Perhaps more controversially, for present purposes I would also classify
an unpublished decision that relies solely on the district court’s decision for
its “reason” as facially under-reasoned and thus a Kafkaesque decision. Some
scholars have suggested that a reason-through-incorporation decision may
satisfy any reason-giving norm at the appellate stage, provided the district
court’s decision is itself sufficiently reasoned.219 From a procedural justice
215 . See infra notes 220–232 (illustrating difference between a purportedly reasoned and
unreasoned decision in two circuits). Although more work is needed to understand the
breadth of the use of unreasoned unpublished decisions, the work that has been done suggests
that nearly all courts rely on summary procedures to some extent. See, e .g ., Mitu Gulati &
C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157, 162
(finding that between 1989 and 1996, the Third Circuit disposed of approximately 60% of its
docket using summary orders).
216 . See JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2018) (identifying categories of written opinions as
“signed”; “reasoned, unsigned”; and “unsigned, without comment”).
217. JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 n.1 (2018).
218 . See Carl Tobias, Fourth Circuit Publication Practices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1733,
1746–47 (2005) (noting that “diverse specificity of ‘without comment’ resolutions” and dispar-
ate circuit record-keeping procedures make it difficult to compare usefully self-reported circuit
“without comment” disposition data).
219. Scholars who have considered the reasoned-through-incorporation appellate deci-
sion have generally approved of its use. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 215, at 163 n.24
(“[W]e think there is an important distinction between dispositions that provide no reasons
and those that provide some reasons, no matter how minimal. Assuming that the most mini-
mal disposition is nothing more than an ‘affirmed based on the district court’s rationale’ or
‘affirmed based on our opinion in case x’ there is still something that an expert lawyer could
work with in constructing an en banc or certiorari petition.”); see also PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET
AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 252–53 (1976) (approving of the use of a similar decision from the
Fourth Circuit when “every issue raised on the appeal was discussed and decided in the opin-
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perspective, however, I disagree for two reasons: First, a reason-through-
incorporation decision may be received as the functional equivalent of an
unexplained decision. Put differently, some readers will assume that the
court issuing an unexplained decision agreed with the district court and its
reasons—even if a holding is distinct from the reasons given for that holding.
Second, the reason-through-incorporation decision lacks both the respon-
siveness to the appellate arguments and the independence from the district
court that are foundational to positive procedural justice experiences.
Let me explain these points by comparing a decision issued under the
Eighth Circuit’s summary procedures and one issued by the Fourth Circuit
that was classified as “reasoned.”220 Consider, first, this decision from the
Eighth Circuit:
PER CURIAM.
Clayton Walker appeals following the district court’s dismissal of his
pro se civil complaint. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’
briefs, we find no error warranting reversal. We therefore affirm the judg-
ment entered in favor of defendants.
See 8th Cir. R. 47B.221
This decision does not tell us anything about the case (other than that it
is “civil”), does not identify the issues on appeal, and does not reveal the ba-
sis for the appellate decision (other than that the appellate court found “no
error warranting reversal”). Although this decision uses more than one
word, it is facially unreasoned; it offers no reason for rejecting Mr. Walker’s
appeal—again, other than that the court has not found an “error warranting
reversal.”222
Now compare the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Mr. Walker’s appeal with
the Fourth Circuit’s treatment of the following pro se appeal—one of the
ion below”); Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for
Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1647 n.33 (2005) (“In those cases in which the district
court itself provided a written explanation of its decision, of course I see no objection to an
explanation simply incorporating that reasoning by reference (e.g., ‘For the reasons expressed
by the court below, we affirm.’) if the district court opinion was published, or by adopting and
reprinting it if it was not published by the district court.”).
220. Available clerk’s annotations suggest that the decision discussed would have been
classified as a “without comment” decision. See Search Results of All June 2017 Opinions in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Database, http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/opnByMM.pl?theMM=06&theYY=2017&A1=Get+Opinions [https://perma.cc/AP7S-
SCCG] (describing Walker appeal as “Civil case. Dismissal affirmed without comment.”). The
Fourth Circuit self-reports that it issues no “without comment” decisions. JUDICIAL BUSINESS
tbl.B-12 (2017).
221. Walker v. Harmon, 689 F. App’x 463 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
222. The court’s language—“no error warranting reversal”—could be read to suggest that
the court found error, but that the error identified did not require reversal (i.e., that the deci-
sion could have been affirmed on alternative grounds). See id . We have no way of knowing
whether that is a fair (or accurate) reading of the court’s short decision.
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twenty-four pro se appeals it handled in the same way during the week of
October 3, 2016223:
PER CURIAM:
Anthony W. Perry appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil
action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accord-
ingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Perry v .
United States, No. 8:14-cv-02862-TDC (D. Md. June 3, 2015). We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED224
Again, the court does not explain the nature of the case (other than that
it is “civil”), does not identify the issues on appeal, and does not (directly)
explain the basis for its decision. Similarities aside, there is a critical differ-
ence between the two: the Fourth Circuit has explained expressly that it “af-
firm[s] for the reasons stated by the district court,” but the Eighth Circuit
has not.225
I contend, first, that the reason-through-incorporation decision is only
marginally better than the otherwise silent decision. Let’s consider these ex-
amples from the appellant’s perspective. It is doubtful that the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s additional verbiage makes much of a difference to Mr. Perry. He might
still rightly feel that the court has not seriously considered the issues he has
raised on appeal. Mr. Perry and Mr. Walker each have received roughly the
same answer to their appeals from the two different courts. Although we (the
public) do not know whether the district court issued a decision in Mr.
Walker’s Eighth Circuit appeal, Mr. Walker knows the answer to that ques-
tion (it did).226 Having received the Eighth Circuit’s cursory decision, Mr.
Walker may have reached the same conclusion that the Fourth Circuit
reached explicitly: the district court got it right and said all that needs to be
said. The only meaningful difference between the two is that one makes ex-
plicit what may be implicit in the other (that the appellate court agreed with
the lower court).
The implicit-incorporation reading is a reasonable one, I contend, espe-
cially where the appellant lacks contextual clues to suggest a different basis
for the appellate court’s decision. That is how a federal court would ordinari-
223 . See supra Introduction (discussing data from Fourth Circuit’s resolution of 104 cas-
es during the first week of October 2016).
224. Perry v. United States, 669 F. App’x 113 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
225 . Compare id ., with Walker, 689 F. App’x 463 (affirming the district court’s decision
without citing its reasoning).
226. Walker v. Harmon, No. CIV. 15–05037–JLV, 2016 WL 5376185 (D.S.D. Sept. 26,
2016). Notably, Mr. Walker (like Mr. Perry) received a relatively robust response from the dis-
trict court; the district court decisions likely satisfied whatever procedural justice expectations
we might have for district court reason-giving. It is conceivable that such reasoned responses
blunted the effect of the appellate decisions.
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ly read an otherwise silent affirmance. For federal habeas corpus review un-
der the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
courts “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning”
as a lower court—unless that presumption can be overcome by other clues as
to the basis of the court’s decision (e.g., briefing on alternative grounds for
affirmance).227 Therefore, unless the appellant has reason to think that the
court might have affirmed for another reason, the appellant may reasonably
conclude that the appellate court has implicitly incorporated the district
court’s reasoning in its otherwise summary decision.
This brings me, however, to the core procedural justice problem with
reasoning through incorporation (whether implicit or explicit): the reasons
the district court gave for the result may be an unsatisfactory answer to an
appeal of that decision.228 As important, an appellate decision that relies
solely on the district court’s reasoning also reveals no independence on the
part of the appellate court; the court appears, instead, to be in lockstep with
the district court.
Further, appeals are not supposed to parrot what occurred in the trial
court; often, the district court’s decision, standing on its own, will not suffi-
ciently answer or respond to the arguments raised on appeal. In any appeal,
the appellant must identify alleged errors in the district court’s reasoning or
decision.229 To say only that the district court was correct does not, then, ex-
plain why the errors alleged are not, in fact, errors. Decisions that look only
227. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (“[In the context of AEDPA, federal
courts should] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the
State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most
likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as alternative
grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the
record it reviewed.”); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).
228. One may perceive some tension between these points: How can we presume incor-
porated reasoning, as the Supreme Court does, if, as I argue, the lower court’s decision cannot,
standing on its own, answer many appeals? Putting aside my disagreement with Ylst and the
perverse incentives it creates, Ylst and its progeny are grounded in the federalism concerns that
animate federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 807 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (incorporating the reasons of his dissent in Coleman v . Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
758–74 (1991), including criticism of the Court’s promotion of federalism at the price of other
values). That incorporated reasoning may be a natural way to read unexplained decisions does
not mean it is a desirable form of appellate decisionmaking; the Supreme Court’s decisions in
this area reflect a reluctance to demand more from state appellate courts—a concern not pre-
sent here.
229. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 requires appellants to state “the issues pre-
sented for review.” FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(5). “The purpose of the rule is to definitely and sepa-
rately point out the errors complained of in order to clearly define and confine the issues on
appeal.” N.Y. Cas. Co. v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n., 119 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1941). Ap-
pellate practitioners advise that appeals “must be packaged in an entirely new way to be effec-
tive in this new forum.” David F. Herr & Cynthia F. Gilbertson, Improving the Odds on Appeal,
BENCH & B. MINN., August 2003, at 17, 17–18; see also Jennifer S. Carroll, Appellate Specializa-
tion and the Art of Appellate Advocacy, FLA. B.J., June 2000, at 107, 107 (“To best understand
exactly what appellate practice is, one must first understand what it is not. Simply stated, ap-
pellate practice is not trial practice.”).
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to the district court to explain away an appeal ultimately lack independence
from the original decisionmaker and are unresponsive to the appeal itself.
Consider this discussion from an unpublished decision in the Third Cir-
cuit, in which the court emphasized that arguments on appeal should re-
spond to the district court decision and be distinct from the arguments
advanced in the lower court:
On appeal, Ream [the appellant] has not responded to the evidentiary
deficiencies identified by the District Court. Instead, she has apparently
cut-and-pasted nearly the entirety of the summary judgment brief she filed
in the District Court, without the courtesy of tailoring her arguments to
conform to the appellate context. . . .
. . . .
Upon review . . . we have little to add to the District Court’s analysis.
Indeed, Ream has not identified a single flaw in the District Court’s cogent
reasoning. We will therefore affirm the order granting summary judgment
for substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s summary
judgment opinion. Counsel is cautioned to take greater care in future briefs
filed with this Court.230
In a footnote, the court recognized that
at times, an argument presented to the District Court will be reiterated on
appeal, and that the judicious use of cutting-and-pasting may be both effi-
cient and appropriate. Here, however, Counsel’s approach of importing a
trial brief wholesale without modifying it to respond to the deficiencies
raised by the District Court was entirely inappropriate.231
Although preservation rules limit the ability of appellants to raise new
arguments on appeal, the Ream decision highlights that ordinarily appeals
are responsive to the district court’s decision and appellate decisions are re-
sponsive to the arguments made on appeal. Only when no new ground has
been trodden, the Third Circuit suggests, might it be sufficient to rely on the
district court’s decision alone as a sufficient response to the appeal. Because
the Ream appellant failed to offer “any direct response” to the district court,
there was nothing new for the appellate court to say. Ream suggests that de-
cisions based on the district court’s reasoning alone should be the excep-
tion—not the rule. And Ream further suggests that when appellants fail to do
their job (that is, to respond to the district court), the best response is to say
so.
All this to say: Has Mr. Perry really received a better decision than Mr.
Walker? Is Mr. Perry’s procedural justice experience superior to Mr. Walk-
er’s because the Fourth Circuit has expressly embraced the reasoning of the
district court (and the Eighth Circuit did not)? Later events suggest an an-
230. Ream v. Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 738 F. App’x 83, 84 (3d Cir. 2018) (footnote
omitted).
231 . Id . at 84 n.1.
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swer: Mr. Perry filed a rehearing petition and asked for his filing fee back.232
Neither appellant received a response from the court that offered any sugges-
tion that the court (1) heard and considered the arguments each had made
on appeal; (2) engaged in neutral decisionmaking (by explaining its own
thought process); (3) exercised independent judgment; or (4) viewed the is-
sues presented as worthy of its time or attention. Whether told directly or
implicitly that the district court’s decision suffices, neither appellant has re-
ceived a direct response. Neither has any reason to believe that he has been
heard, that the court has, in fact, considered his arguments. By failing even
to identify the issues on appeal, the court gave the appellant no reason to be-
lieve that it even understood the arguments he made (or, worse, even read
the briefs).233
I do not want to leave you with the impression that Mr. Perry and Mr.
Walker had meritorious appeals; they did not. Nor was the briefing in their
appeals effective. But they are representative of the class of appellants who
receive Kafkaesque decisions. Some of those appellants will have more meri-
torious appeals. But for my argument in Part IV to have any force, I must
question whether courts can and should say more even in cases like Mr. Per-
ry’s and Mr. Walker’s.
The extent of the use of Kafkaesque decisions is beyond the scope of this
Article.234 Suffice it to say that even in circuits that claim to issue no deci-
sions “without comment,” use of Kafkaesque decisions is widespread. The
Fourth Circuit, which issued the decision in Mr. Perry’s appeal discussed
above, is a good example. Although the Fourth Circuit reports that it never
issues decisions “without comment,” it issues decisions like the one Mr. Per-
ry received frequently—indeed, daily (at least twenty-three others the week
Mr. Perry received his decision). Before 1971, when the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter first observed that “too many opinions are being printed,”235 the Fourth
232. Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing en banc at 2, Perry v. United
States, 669 F. App’x 113 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 2016) (No. 16-1129) (“If this Court affirms closure,
remit $1000.00 to me and send the entire docket to the Federal District Court of the District of
Columbia. I paid that money for a hearing on my claims not as a giveaway to the state.”).
233 . See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 282–83 (“When a judge makes no at-
tempt to provide a satisfactory explanation of the result, neither the actual litigants nor subse-
quent readers of an opinion can know whether the judge paid careful attention to the
case . . . .”).
234. Although examining the extent of the courts of appeals’ use of the Kafkaesque deci-
sion is a project for another day, I note anecdotally that Kafkaesque decisions can be found to
varying degrees in numerous circuits. In addition to the Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit ex-
amples discussed above, see, for example, Zaharescu v . JPMorgan Chase Bank, N .A ., 696 F.
App’x 827 (9th Cir. 2017); AYDM Associates, LLC v . Town of Pamelia, 692 F. App’x 78 (2d Cir.
2017); Robinson v . Guberman, No. 16-2330, 2017 WL 5197125, at *1 (1st Cir. Mar. 13, 2017);
United States v . Arvelo-Negron, No. 15-1949 (1st Cir. Mar. 2, 2017); Shakir v . Jim Murray Fi-
nancial, 674 F. App’x 421 (5th Cir. 2017); and Fobbs v . Maiorana, 676 F. App’x 298 (5th Cir.
2017).
235. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1971), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default
/files/2012/AnnRep71.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA4D-7K3G].
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Circuit had issued twenty-one decisions in which it explained that a judg-
ment was affirmed for the reasons given by a district court or district
judge.236 Notably, those twenty-one decisions spanned nearly a century (the
earliest was 1888, before the Fourth Circuit itself existed),237 and every single
one was published or reported—meaning, it was printed in the official Fed-
eral Reporter and had precedential value.238 Since 1971, however, the court
has issued more than 22,500 opinions stating that it was affirming for the
reasons given by the district court or district judge.239 More than 96% of
those decisions have issued since 1990.240 Only about 500 of those decisions
were published.
In sum, the Kafkaesque decision has the following features: it is a per-
functory decision that either affirms without giving any reason or affirms on
the basis of the district court’s decision alone. The Kafkaesque decision lacks
any suggestion of independent decisionmaking, and it is nonresponsive to
the arguments made on appeal. It does not identify the issues on appeal or
explain why the appellate arguments are wrong. It is also inscrutable to the
public. Kafkaesque decisions reflect the barest appellate process, and they are
the most problematic unpublished decisions from a procedural justice per-
spective.
IV. REASON-GIVING IN UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS
Some unpublished decisions raise greater procedural justice concerns
than others. Publishable decisions, which are almost indistinguishable from
published decisions, may be problematic from a precedential or lawmaking
perspective, but they otherwise reflect independence from the district court,
respect for the litigant, and responsiveness to the appellant’s arguments.
Kafkaesque decisions, on the other hand, do the opposite. The memo decision
appears to be an appealing alternative to the barebones and unresponsive
Kafkaesque decision, but it too is far from perfect. Arguably, the avoidant de-
236. The Fourth Circuit uses boilerplate language to resolve many appeals. To determine
the history of that practice, I searched the Fourth Circuit database on Westlaw using the fol-
lowing search terms for each decade after 1970, adjusting the date range for the relevant dec-
ade: advanced: ((affirm! /4 reason! /4 “district court” “district judge”)) & DA(aft-12-31-1970 &
bef 01-01-1980).
237. McLane v. United States, 35 F. 926, 927 (C.C.D. Md. 1888) (“[W]e are of opinion
that the decision of the district court should be affirmed; and the reasons submitted in the dis-
trict court in support of its judgment, in its opinion filed in the cause, are so well considered
and ample to sustain its judgment, that no further opinion is required in the case, and a decree
will be signed affirming that judgment.”).
238 . See, e .g ., id .
239 . See supra note 236 (discussing Westlaw search process). Some of the search results
possibly captured cases where a judge might have stated that she would affirm for the reasons
given by the district court, while also explaining her analysis in some depth. Such formulation
would have been used before publication practices changed, and the data suggest that formula-
tion was used sparingly before the 1970s.
240. Only 29 such decisions issued in the 1970s; 744 issued in the 1980s.
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cision has some institutional value without undermining the litigant’s proce-
dural justice experience—even if an avoidant decision may be a relatively
unsatisfying end to the appellate process. This Part articulates and defends a
minimum reason-giving expectation for most unpublished decisions, with
an eye toward furthering procedural justice values in interactions between
vulnerable litigants and the federal appellate courts. I argue that independent
reasons for rejecting an appeal should almost always be given when oral ar-
gument is not; otherwise, unpublished decisions threaten to undermine es-
sential procedural justice values at the appellate stage.
A. The Argument Against Kafkaesque Decisions
The argument for reason-giving in most unpublished decisions is not
hard: where the litigant has had no other touchpoint with judicial authority
in the appellate process, the reasons given to explain the result are the court’s
only opportunity to further procedural justice values. The decision itself is
the most meaningful touchpoint in the process; to the extent appellate courts
strive to meet procedural justice goals, reason-giving shows litigants respect,
allows for meaningful participation, and demonstrates the decisionmaker’s
independence and trustworthiness.
Decisions that lack these basic elements of fair process—as Kafkaesque
decisions do—must serve other, weightier interests if they are to have any
place in the appellate justice system. Kafkaesque decisions do not. In her
thoughtful work on reason-giving, Mathilde Cohen identifies three core ob-
jections to a reason-giving norm: reason-giving (1) takes too much time,241
(2) “yield[s] insincerity and artificiality,”242 and (3) undermines institutional
values.243 None of these reasons against reason-giving offers shelter to the
Kafkaesque decision.
Let’s start with the first, which may be the most obvious in this context:
reason-giving takes enormous time—time that the unpublished decision was
meant to save. Shortchanging reason-giving in some circumstances frees up
resources for careful reason-giving in others. Harder cases get more time and
resources, at the expense of the easy cases. Especially from a procedural in-
strumentalist’s perspective, that may be a reasonable—even a desirable—
distribution of resources. Why reinvent the wheel? But even the instrumen-
talist might have some concern that a court’s failure to engage in independ-
ent reasoning might create opportunities for error.244 A reason-giving
241. Cohen, supra note 162, at 522–25.
242 . Id . at 522.
243 . Id . at 514–17.
244. At least for a time, there was concern among judges that unpublished decisions
should not be cited because the staff attorneys who wrote them were “kids that are just out of
law school” who were “sloppy or wrong”—hardly a ringing endorsement for the accuracy of
unpublished decisions. See Macfarlane, supra note 25, at 129 (quoting Penelope Pether, Sorcer-
ers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U .S . Law, 39 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1, 6, 17 (2007)) (discussing perceptions of staff attorneys’ work).
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discipline can ensure accuracy,245 and that discipline is most effective when
the decisionmaker attempts to work through her own reasoning246—a pro-
cess that also serves to signal the independence of the decisionmaker.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Welch v .
United States,247 involving the retroactive application of the Court’s decision
in Johnson v . United States,248 which had held that a portion of the Armed
Career Criminal Act249 was unconstitutionally vague.250 The Eleventh Circuit
had denied the appellant, who was proceeding pro se,251 a certificate of ap-
pealability252 on the retroactivity issue—a standard that required an Eleventh
Circuit judge to conclude that no “reasonable jurist[] could debate wheth-
er . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner . . . .”253
To deny the relief Mr. Welch sought, the court had to conclude that it was
“beyond all debate” that he was not entitled to relief.254 The Eleventh Circuit
presumably did so based on the reasoning of the district court’s decision
alone, because it offered no reasons for the denial of a certificate of appeala-
245. In the process of giving reasons, a judge may discover that the decision “just won’t
write,” where a result that may have seemed justifiable “cannot survive the journey to written
form.” Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1283, 1318 (2008) (“Most judges, like others to have opined on the subject, buy into the
notion that writing provides an important discipline on thought.”). Chad Oldfather’s work
largely confirms this intuition: a reason-giving discipline may benefit accuracy—at least in
some cases. See id . (“Our study of the relationship between writing and cognition suggests that
this understanding [of the use of written decisions as a constraint on judicial decisionmaking]
is largely appropriate. Legal decisionmaking, much like solving the Tower of Hanoi, often re-
quires thought to proceed in logical steps, such that a decisionmaking process with a written
component could be expected to increase its effectiveness.”).
246. One might point out that, more often than not, the person who works through the
reasons given to support a particular decision is a judicial staff attorney, not a judge. See supra
text accompanying notes 99–102 (discussing the role of staff attorneys). If the actual “deci-
sionmakers” have worked through their reasons in a private memorandum that accompanies
the perfunctory public unpublished decision, then the question of reason-giving is ultimately a
question of disclosure, not a question of accuracy. But see supra note 244 (discussing concern
over judicial staff errors and sloppiness). The instrumentalist may find the mere existence of
the private memorandum sufficient to allay any concerns over accuracy, but my procedural
justice lens necessarily takes a less instrumental view.
247. 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
248. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
249. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
250 . Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557, 2560.
251 . Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1263. Mr. Welch also filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiora-
ri, providing the necessary exception to my expectation that it is more difficult for second-tier
appellants to obtain further review from Kafkaesque decisions. Id .
252. Welch v. United States, No. 14-15733-C (11th Cir. June 9, 2015) (order denying cer-
tificate of appealability).
253 . Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Eleventh Circuit’s decision operat-
ed as a merits determination, given the showing required for relief. See id . (setting standard for
obtaining a certificate of appealability).
254 . Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264.
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bility.255 In a seven-to-one decision, however, the Supreme Court held not
only that the Eleventh Circuit should have granted Mr. Welch a certificate of
appealability but also that he may have been entitled to an amended sentence
because he had argued correctly that Johnson should apply retroactively.256
The point should be plain: independent reason-giving, even in appeals
that appear to be losers, may well avoid the errors inattention sometimes
produces. So even an instrumentalist may hesitate to ascribe to the view that
unpublished decisions need no reasons at all—if for no reason other than
that such decisions may be essentially unreviewable by the Supreme Court,
and some errors may go undiscovered as a result of abandoning reason-
giving (if we consider Welch to be the exception that proves the rule).257 If
courts insulate their reasons from public or judicial scrutiny, no one—not
lower courts, not judges on the panel, not the Supreme Court—can fault the
decision’s reasoning or detect its error.
So, let’s assume that even the most instrumental among us would agree
that at least some unpublished decisions need reasons; the difficulty, then,
would be deciding which decisions deserve reasons and which do not. That’s
a very difficult question to answer in the abstract. Perhaps, instead, we
should consider what kind of time investment we might be asking courts to
make if they were to offer reasons in nearly all unpublished decisions. If we
are balancing the efficiency benefits with the risk of error, perhaps we should
know what the efficiency benefits really are before we relieve courts of any
reason-giving expectation in a significant number of decisions.
The instrumentalist’s concern with reason-giving is only persuasive, in
my view, if the instrumentalist’s central presumption holds true: that reason-
giving in unpublished decisions takes significant judicial time, thereby taking
judicial time away from other, more complex appeals.258
But that presumption is likely only true in a limited sense, and it stretch-
es credulity in the main. I will first explain the circumstances in which I
would agree that facially under-reasoned unpublished decisions may save
significant time. Then, I will debunk the time-saving fallacy more broadly.
Although I do not take an instrumental view of procedure, I suggest that in-
strumentalists may overvalue time-saving, while undervaluing public disclo-
sure of the reasons for a particular appellate decision.
255 . See Welch, No. 14-15733 (order denying certificate of appealability).
256 . Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268 (remanding case to determine whether Mr. Welch was en-
titled to relief or whether, instead, he qualified for a sentencing enhancement under another
provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act).
257. And Welch surely is the exception, not the rule, because the Supreme Court is not
usually an error-correcting court. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
258. It is possible that these decisions actually free up judicial time to do other things en-
tirely, i.e., that judges are, in fact, leisure-seeking. For purposes of this Article, however, I will
assume, that the administration of judicial resources has been arranged to maximize resources
available for the most difficult or “important” cases—an assumption that animates much of the
judicial writing on unpublished decisions.
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First, I agree that some unpublished decisions save significant judicial
time. I suspect, however, that time-saving is greatest in the circumstances
that produce the avoidant decision—that is, in particularly complex or diffi-
cult appeals in which judges agree on outcome but not on reasoning. If the
value to be maximized under our unpublication regime is efficiency, then the
avoidant decision makes good sense. To be sure, preparing for oral argument
requires a significant investment of judicial time.259 But a summary adjudica-
tion offers judges an efficiency boon when they are certain about an outcome
but less certain about the reasons for getting there. For many judges, the
opinion-writing process itself requires the most effort and the greatest in-
vestment of resources.260
But now, let’s debunk the time-saving fallacy of the unpublished deci-
sion. The kind of time-saving the avoidant decision offers is the exception,
not the norm. Most unpublished decisions are only time intensive in the ag-
gregate. If, as courts press, they use unpublished decisions only for routine,
second-tier appeals involving common appellate issues,261 it should take little
effort to explain the reasons for the court’s decision. If the case involves
complex or unsettled issues, then by the court’s own rules, the appeal should
be bumped to the first track for a deeper dive. But where the law is settled
and the application of the law to the facts is not subject to disagreement, the
giving of reasons should be straightforward and easy to do.
Even more importantly, reason-giving should already have been done by
a staff attorney. In every circuit, staff attorneys draft memoranda recom-
mending the disposition of many of the appeals that result in unpublished
decisions.262 Surely, those memoranda say more than “See the district court’s
259. Remember that the avoidant decision comes from a first-tier appeal—that is, an ap-
peal that has full appellate process in all other respects but happens to result in a perfunctory
decision after oral argument. See supra Section III.C; see also Charles R. Wilson, How Opinions
Are Developed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 32 STETSON L.
REV. 247, 252 (2003) (“Each judge thoroughly prepares for oral argument and usually arrives at
the sitting with questions about each case. When those questions are answered at oral argu-
ment, the correct ruling often becomes clear to the judges.”). Judge Wilson’s description of the
appellate process in the Eleventh Circuit suggests that the Eleventh Circuit uses the perfuncto-
ry post-argument decision to provide swift justice when the outcome is clear. Id . at 252–53. He
does not suggest that the court issues these decisions to avoid certain questions post-argument,
as seems to have occurred in Henry v . City of Mt . Dora, see supra notes 201–206 and accompa-
nying text.
260. For an extreme illustration, consider Kozinski’s description of his opinion-writing
process: “My clerks and I normally go through 20–30 drafts of an opinion; 50 or 60 drafts is
not uncommon as I polish and revise, shift footnotes and add rhetorical flourishes over the
course of weeks, sometimes months.” Alex Kozinski, Essay, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100
YALE L.J. 1707, 1711 n.9 (1991).
261 . See supra text accompanying notes 182–184.
262 . See, e .g ., POSNER, supra note 21, at 88–116 (reprinting staff attorney memoranda);
Levy, supra note 14, at 344–54 (describing staff attorneys’ work).
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decision.”263 The point is: the reasons already exist somewhere within the
court’s private files; the only question for the judges assigned to the case is
whether to disclose those reasons to the litigants and whether to subject
those reasons to scrutiny.
I will concede, for the sake of argument, that reason-giving in all sec-
ond-tier appeals, in the aggregate, may take more judicial time.264 It will, at
the very least, add to the time judges spend reviewing the substance of the
unpublished decision. How can that possibly be a bad thing, given that the
decision has persuasive value and affects someone’s life? If our courts of ap-
peals were still laboring under ever-increasing caseloads or were moving
slower year-over-year, the cost of additional review before terminating an
appeal might weigh against a reason-giving expectation for second-tier ap-
peals. But that is not the case.265 Nor do litigants care particularly about judi-
cial delay.266 For the reasons discussed, decisional quality likely has a far
more significant impact on litigants’ perception of procedural fairness than
any delay in waiting for that decision.267
If time costs are not enough to defeat a reason-giving expectation, then
let’s turn to the next potential objection: a reason-giving norm may unwit-
tingly foster insincerity.268 Those who distrust the sincerity of judicial deci-
sionmakers may be especially concerned about a reason-giving expectation,
as it may only exacerbate that distrust. Even for those of us who view judicial
decisionmakers more benevolently, the “psychology of motivated reason-
ing”269 suggests that requiring reasoned explanations might “encourage
263. Controversially, Judge Posner gave us a window into these memoranda by publish-
ing several in his self-published book; indeed, they do more. See POSNER, supra note 21, at 87–
96.
264 . But see Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence: Federal
District Judges in the Courtroom, 2008–2012, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 243, 272–73 (2013) (finding
no correlation between increased bench presence—the amount of time a judge spends presid-
ing over adjudication of issues in open court, as a rough measure of procedural fairness—and
average case disposition times).
265 . See supra text accompanying notes 116–118, 135–137 (discussing caseload statistics
and median times for resolution).
266 . See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Calibrating Participation: Reflections on Procedure
Versus Procedural Justice, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 323, 351 (2016) (“For decades, however, proce-
dural justice studies have suggested that cost and delay do not play a significant role in liti-
gants’ opinions of procedural fairness.” (citing E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, R-3708-ICJ, THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 55–56 (1989) (“Delay ap-
pears not to play a substantial role in determining whether tort procedures are seen as fair and
whether the litigant leaves the court satisfied.”))).
267. I imagine that the quality of the decision might color one’s perception of the time
taken for a court to resolve an appeal; litigants might well feel differently about a long wait for
a fully reasoned result than a short wait for a Kafkaesque result.
268. Cohen, supra note 162, at 518–22.
269 . Id . at 520; see id . at 519 n.204 (“We often search for a convincing rationale for the
decisions that we make, whether for inter-personal purposes, so that we can explain to others
the reasons for our decision, or for intra-personal motives, so that we may feel confident of
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judges to think about their reasons for the decision in a strategic way before
deciding the outcome” and “may work as an incentive for [judges] to fabri-
cate post hoc constructions intended to justify their intuitions.”270 Put simp-
ly, judges may not give the actual reasons for a particular decision; if we re-
require judges to explain themselves, they may do so insincerely.271
If courts weren’t free to “avoid” the issue, the appeals that create
avoidant decisions might be ripe for post hoc rationalizing of the sort Cohen
warns may lead to insincere results.272 Where there is little precedent to
guide the decisionmaker, her decisionmaking process may be less logical and
more intuitive than we might expect or desire. This risk seems greatest in
cases with novel questions or unusual circumstances, but it is also present in
contentious or divisive cases. Again, this suggests a limited role for avoidant
decisions. But I struggle to see how routine appeals would be fertile ground
for insincere results.
Finally, let’s turn to the institutional objection to reason-giving. Reason-
giving may force undesirable—indeed, counterproductive—agreement
among decisionmakers, especially on multimember courts. Cass Sunstein
and Frederick Schauer have separately identified two interconnected institu-
tional costs of an inflexible reason-giving norm. First, Sunstein has argued
that incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes are neces-
sary and, indeed, valuable.273 Judges more easily agree “on relatively narrow
or low-level explanations” for their decisions, according to Sunstein, and,
when they do, “[t]hey need not agree on fundamental principle.”274 Armed
with only this limited agreement, judges might well say less, not more, to de-
cide a case.275
Similarly, Schauer contends that reason-giving can bind judges in unde-
sirable ways, because “to provide a reason for a decision is to include that de-
cision within a principle of greater generality than the decision itself.”276
Giving a reason thus commits the reason-giver (more or less) to that gener-
ality (actually, a rule), too, and to applying that generality again in a case that
also falls within it. Likewise, “when we justify a rule or principle itself,” we
invoke greater levels of generality, thus “put[ting] the class of instances en-
compassed by it within a wider class of instances encompassed by a more
having made the ‘right’ choice.” (quoting Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49
COGNITION 11, 33 (1993))).
270 . Id . at 520–21.
271 . But see Micah Schwartzman, Essay, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1005
(2008) (arguing that judges must publicly state reasons for their decisions so that “parties to a
case, and all others whose interests might be affected by its outcome [can] know why the law
has been applied in one way rather than another”).
272 . See supra note 269.
273. Sunstein, supra note 187, at 1735.
274 . Id . at 1736.
275 . Id . (“[Judges] do not offer larger or more abstract explanations than are necessary to
decide the case.”).
276. Schauer, supra note 162, at 641 (emphasis omitted).
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general principle.”277 Reason-giving ultimately forces the reason-giver “to
transcend the very particularity of that case.”278 A judge who says little more
than “affirmed” or “we find no error” has issued, instead, a highly particular-
ized decision.279 That kind of particularized decision may avoid the thought-
less or unfortunate commitment to a reason, a rule, or a generality over
which the reason-giver is less sure.280
In our context, however, neither of these reasons not to give reasons
should hold any particular sway. We’re thinking about decisions that are
nonprecedential; they have no binding effect on lower courts or other panels.
We are less worried about the kinds of agreement costs that Schauer and
Sunstein identify; the publication decision itself mitigates much of that con-
cern. Indeed, even the publishable decision does not bind, thus suggesting it
may have an institutional role where judges find it difficult to reach agree-
ment on a precedential outcome.
To the extent we find institutional worries about reason-giving in un-
published decisions, however, those concerns are likely most significant in
cases presenting unusual factual scenarios or particularly difficult or novel
questions. By definition, Kafkaesque decisions are not born in these contexts,
but avoidant decisions always are. In some exceptional cases, judges rightly
may be hesitant to give reasons in particularly novel or complex cases, for
fear (as Schauer has suggested)281 that they may be bound to more general
rules over which they have less certainty, even if they are bound only in some
loose sense because the decision has, at most, only persuasive value. Forcing
agreement over more fundamental principles—even in unpublished deci-
sions—may sow disharmony in the court and (especially) uncertainty in the
circuit’s law.
Although I can find room for some avoidant decisions in an unpublica-
tion scheme, I do not mean to suggest that courts should be in the business
of avoiding complex issues—only that doing so may sometimes be defensible
in light of the institutional costs of an inflexible reason-giving requirement.
In difficult cases, however, the accuracy-enhancing effects of reason-giving
are likely great.282 Courts, therefore, must be careful in exercising their in-
277 . Id .
278 . Id .
279 . Id . at 640 (explaining that the “extreme of nongenerality is ‘specificity’ or ‘particu-
larity’ ” and that “generality and particularity mark opposite directions on the same scale”); see
also Sunstein, supra note 187, at 1754 (“With full particularity, the judgment is not merely in-
completely theorized; it is not theorized at all.”).
280 . See Schauer, supra note 162, at 656 (“Having given a reason, the reason-giver has, by
virtue of an existing social practice, committed herself to deciding those cases within the scope
of the reason in accordance with the reason.”).
281 . See id . at 654–56 (describing commitment costs).
282 . See supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing the “just won’t write” phe-
nomenon).
590 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:533
herent discretion to avoid issues.283 Withholding reasons in a complex case
may be understandable, but even where the decision is itself legally correct,
the withholding may not be justifiable. Courts generally should know the
difference between the complex one-off and the recurring issue or the high-
profile case that calls for public reasons, even if courts may not be able to
predict with perfect foresight when a lawmaking decision is needed and
when an unpublished decision would suffice.284 And if the issue is, indeed,
recurring, surely the court will have an opportunity to address it again—and
fix its mistaken failure to issue a reasoned (and, likely, lawmaking) decision
when the issue first arose.
Even if unpublished decisions generally raise fewer of the kinds of insti-
tutional concerns Cohen has identified, it may be that courts are reluctant to
issue even minimally reasoned decisions in many unpublished decisions for
fear of creating more “junk” law.285 Because unpublished decisions issued
after 2006 are citable,286 an unpublished decision that says enough about the
case and the basis for the decision may be persuasive to lower courts and fu-
ture appellate panels. To avoid any inadvertent lawmaking effects for lightly
considered appeals, courts may use Kafkaesque and avoidant decisions as the
functional equivalent of the no-citation rule. By saying next to nothing,
courts effectively make their decisions uncitable.287
In doing so, however, the courts also deprive everyone—litigants, the
public, other courts—of important information about how and why the ap-
peal was resolved as it was. Failing to explain why a particular recurring issue
or argument is wrong wastes a valuable signaling opportunity. If courts were
to show repeat players (like prisoners) that the arguments they advance have
been tried unsuccessfully many times before—a fact that cannot be gleaned
from the face of the Kafkaesque decision itself—perhaps the volume of pro
se appeals might begin to recede. Although a reduction in pro se appeals is
not a goal I urge courts to pursue, judges may feel differently—and see the
283 . See Sunstein, supra note 187, at 1751 (“If judges on a panel have actually agreed on a
general theory, and if they are truly committed to it, they should say so (even if, for reasons I
have suggested, they should usually be reluctant to commit). Judges and the general communi-
ty will learn much more if they are able to discuss the true motivating grounds for outcomes.”).
284 . See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 42, at 1191–94 (arguing that judges are not
able to predict when decisions should be precedential or not).
285. Chief Judge Howard Markey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
once described unpublished decisions as “junk.” Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, Remarks at
the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (May 24, 1989), in 128 F.R.D. 409, 414 (1989).
286. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
287. Kafkaesque decisions that incorporate the reasoning of a lower court may be citable
by reference to the lower court decision. See, e .g ., supra note 224 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Perry decision). But the Kafkaesque decision’s facial inscrutability may render it
useless to many; anyone searching through a commercial database of court of appeals decisions
for a particular fact pattern or legal proposition would not find a decision like the Perry case
(unless the lower court decision was appended to the court of appeals decision).
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possibility of such reduction as a good reason to devote more time to pro se
appeals.
Similarly, judges may see the Kafkaesque decision as the best solution to
a nuisance: meritless appeals from frequent filers, including, especially, pris-
oners. I question the effectiveness of Kafkaesque decisions to deter nuisance
filings, given what we know of their procedural justice effects and the rea-
sons why losing appellants appeal.288 And, to the extent the unpublished de-
cision itself was meant to be a deterrent to such filings, the rise of pro se
litigation suggests that it has not been effective. Regardless, courts have other
tools to combat truly frivolous filings, including “three strikes” laws to re-
strict prisoner filings.289 Although I’m not advocating for these tools, they
are direct and transparent. If courts believe an appeal is truly frivolous, they
should say so; otherwise, how is the pro se litigant to know?
Put simply, the reasons not to give reasons are unconvincing in the con-
text of Kafkaesque decisions. Time-saving, worries about insincerity, and in-
stitutional concerns are slight and surely outweighed by the benefit of
reason-giving to a decision’s recipient. If reason-giving does not take up sig-
nificant resources or impose other systemic costs, courts should offer rea-
sons for their decisions whenever doing so might offer some benefit—and
especially when withholding reasons might inflict individual and institution-
al harm.
B. The Argument for a Minimum Reason-Giving Requirement
To maximize the procedural justice experience of unpublished deci-
sions, I urge courts to issue unpublished decisions that at least do the follow-
ing: independently (1) identify the issues on appeal; (2) explain the relevant
law; and (3) apply that law to key facts. Some decisions may call for more,
but few should issue with less—unless the case implicates the institutional
concerns that create avoidant decisions, which may have a limited role to
play in an unpublication scheme (without undermining the litigant’s proce-
dural justice experience).
The reason-giving expectation I propose can be accomplished succinct-
ly, as the Eleventh Circuit example illustrates.290 The decision will likely bor-
row heavily from, if not rest entirely on, the work of the staff attorney who
reviewed the appeal and prepared a memorandum recommending a disposi-
tion. This alternative may underscore just how abysmal the Kafkaesque deci-
288 . See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text (discussing study on reasons why
individuals appeal, knowing that chances of success are remote).
289 . See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (requiring prisoners to pay court filing fees up front if
they have three “strikes,” i.e., dismissals based on frivolousness, maliciousness, and even failure
to state a claim); FED. R. APP. P. 38 (sanctions for frivolous appeals).
290 . See supra note 199 and accompanying text (reproducing Edgerton decision). My rea-
son-giving recommendation is also not particularly new. In 1975, the Commission on Revision
of the Federal Court Appellate System, chaired by Senator Roman Hruska, made a similar rec-
ommendation. See supra note 198.
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sion is: can a simplistic analysis that may be nothing more than a cut-and-
paste job from a staff attorney memo really be preferable? Admittedly, I am
proposing only modest, incremental improvement: courts should do away
with Kafkaesque decisions in favor of memo decisions in every appeal that
does not go to oral argument.
The memo decision has superior procedural justice effects for at least
two reasons. First, Tyler’s work underscores that it is the perception of partic-
ipation that matters most for experiences of procedural justice. What mat-
ters is that a court appears to have considered the litigant’s arguments, not
that those arguments have had any actual effect on the decision. Identifica-
tion of the issues raised provides some contextual clue that the briefs have
been read and understood. Even where courts continue to reason through
incorporation, it is possible that merely identifying the arguments raised on
appeal might have positive procedural justice effects. To that end, where the
litigant has simply rehashed her trial court brief, the court should say so.
Perhaps in these circumstances something less than the Eleventh Circuit’s
treatment of Ms. Edgerton’s appeal is sufficiently responsive, but the court
should explain why it has failed to engage with the appellate arguments.
Second, independent reasoning (even if taken verbatim from a staff at-
torney memo, which may well be the only independent work done in an ap-
peal) is likely more responsive to the arguments made on appeal than the
district court’s decision will be. Responsive reasoning not only validates the
appellant’s voice, but it also provides an opportunity for the court to demon-
strate its independence from the district court and to be accountable for its
own decision. The appearance of independent review may—and I stress
may—provide some “cushion” to tolerate and legitimate a bad result.291
Memo decisions may be preferable only because pro se and other sec-
ond-tier litigants are likely unaware of certain features of appellate process.
They may not know that the memo decision likely involved the same
amount of judicial time and scrutiny as the Kafkaesque decision. They may
not know that staff attorneys have primary responsibility (if not ultimate au-
thority) for the resolution of their appeals, no matter how detailed the result.
Indeed, were these facts widely known, the memo decision’s procedural jus-
tice effects might be marginal at best. Research on the subjective experience
of second-tier appellants would help us better understand—and not just ex-
trapolate from other descriptive models—the procedural justice effects of
reason-giving in this context.
Finally, some pro se litigants may not be able to decipher a fully rea-
soned published, publishable, or even a memo decision without the benefit
of a lawyer’s guidance—a feeling familiar to many law students. Many (if not
most) pro se litigants will not have had access to the same educational op-
portunities as the readers and writers of law review articles. That fact, how-
291 . See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 36, at 107 (noting that “fair
procedures can act as a cushion of support when authorities are delivering unfavorable out-
comes” and that the cushion may be “fairly robust”).
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ever, should not change our reason-giving expectation to any significant de-
gree, though it may affect how courts articulate those reasons. The pro se lit-
igant surely can tell the difference between the Kafkaesque decision and the
memo decision; she knows the back of the hand when she sees it. Posner’s
recent work on reason-giving in pro se appeals292 goes further than I will (for
now) to urge courts to write decisions that actually educate pro se litigants.293
His judge-as-teacher model has much to commend it, and future work
should consider more deeply the role of (and any limits on) appellate court
activism in pro se appeals. For now, though, courts can improve their output
significantly by eliminating Kafkaesque decisions entirely, in favor of memo
decisions of varying degrees (that is, some may look more like the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision and some more like the Eleventh Circuit’s).
CONCLUSION
Our federal courts of appeals face an enormous workload. The pressures
of time make it impossible for any of us—whether we are judges, practicing
lawyers, or academics—to do our best work all of the time. In a world of
fixed resources, the way the federal courts of appeals have decided to manage
their dockets may strike many as the right balance.294 But the question of re-
source allocation is distinct from considerations of the quality of judicial
output in unpublished decisions. And by any measure, the Kafkaesque deci-
sion should have no place in our judicial system.
I am mindful, however, that it is easy for an academic to criticize the ju-
diciary—even an academic who has served as a law clerk to a judge on one of
our nation’s busiest courts. It may be better to hear the same message from a
fellow judge, the late Judge Patricia Wald: “Terse orders and memoranda
may be the only possible judicial response to a large number of cases in an
overcrowded system, but we must be careful that our decisions do not dete-
riorate into standardized forms.”295
I am not urging judges to spend more time on unpublished decisions—
though I suspect doing so might reduce the risk of error and greatly improve
those decisions and their procedural justice effects. I do, however, urge
courts to make public the reasons they already have for ruling how they rule:
give litigants the reasons contained in the staff attorney’s (or law clerk’s)
292 . See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Posner’s work on pro se ap-
peals in federal courts of appeals).
293 . See POSNER, supra note 21, at 29 (suggesting that courts should “[p]rovide brief
statements of the reason(s) for denying an appeal, in simple language intelligible to pro se’s”);
id . at 46–47 (recommending staff attorney explore other avenues of relief available to pro se
litigant, which court might include in its decision).
294 . See Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of
How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
401, 406 (2013) (concluding that current case-management practices comport fairly well with
an idealized system that maximizes error correction and lawmaking).
295. Wald, supra note 29, at 779.
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memo where doing so does not implicate the institutional concerns that un-
dergird the avoidant decision.296 Reason-giving is an important—and usually
the only—procedural justice experience in the appellate process for second-
tier appeals.
296. Based on my experience as a law clerk on the Eleventh Circuit and based on what
Posner has revealed in his work, Reforming the Judiciary, some courts already follow this prac-
tice in many cases. See POSNER, supra note 21, at 16–17 (discussing work of staff attorney’s in
drafting unpublished decisions); id . at 88–97 (example of staff attorney work product). Posner
notes that, at least in the view of the Seventh Circuit’s staff attorneys’ office, the Seventh Circuit
issues relatively lengthy and reasoned unpublished decisions compared to other courts. See id .
at 18.
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APPENDIX A:
UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS AND PRO SE APPEALS297
The figures in Appendix A show two trends by circuit: the volume of pro
se appeals commenced (as measured against the entire volume of appellate
litigation) and the volume of unpublished merits decisions issued (as meas-
ured against all merits decisions). In each geographic circuit other than the
D.C. Circuit (see Figure A-1), the volume of both unpublished decisions and
the percentage of pro se appellate litigation has increased since 1997.
FIGURE A-1
297. All data have been drawn from JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (1997–2017) and










1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
D.C. Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997
Pro Se Unpub Linear (Pro Se ) Linear (Unpub )












1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
First Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997










1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Second Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997
Pro Se Unpub Linear (Pro Se ) Linear (Unpub )












1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Third Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997










1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Fourth Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997
Pro Se Unpub Linear (Pro Se ) Linear (Unpub )












1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Fifth Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997










1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Sixth Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997
Pro Se Unpub Linear (Pro Se ) Linear (Unpub )












1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Seventh Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997










1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Eighth Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997
Pro Se Unpub Linear (Pro Se ) Linear (Unpub )












1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Ninth Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and Unpublished
Merits Decisions Since 1997










1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Tenth Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997
Pro Se Unpub Linear (Pro Se) Linear (Unpub )











1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Eleventh Circuit Percentage of Pro Se Appeals and
Unpublished Merits Decisions Since 1997
Pro Se Unpub Linear (Pro Se ) Linear (Unpub)
602 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:533
APPENDIX B:
APPEALS COMMENCED OVER TIME BY CIRCUIT298
The figures below capture the overall downward trend in appeals filed
annually in each of the geographic U.S. courts of appeals since 1997.
FIGURE B-1
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